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Export Processing Zones and Development: The Tanzanian Experience in the Face of 
Neoliberal Policy Prescriptions 
By Mehjabeen Amir Alarakhia 
Abstract 
Export Processing Zones (EPZs) is an economic policy model used to accelerate 
industrialization and is employed by many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and in 
many parts of the developing world. It is believed that EPZs can lead to industrialization 
mainly by increasing exports, diversifying domestic industry and large scale employment 
creation. 
This thesis examines the role of the state in developing EPZs in relation to 
protecting domestic capital while trying to attract foreign capital. Tanzania's EPZ 
policies are examined to determine if the policy environment established allows the state 
to actively engage in directing investment and developing domestic industry in order to 
promote industrialization. 
The thesis demonstrates that although Tanzania aims at emulating the Asian 
countries success in industrializing using EPZs, Tanzania has not developed an 
interventionist model and the role of the state has been reduced to be minimalist 
following neoliberal prescriptions. 
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One of the primary strategies of development pursued by countries is 
industrialization. Industrialization has allowed countries to be able to expand their 
exports, particularly to increase the value of their products, and increase the employment 
opportunities within a country. Countries that have been able to develop a viable 
industrial sector have in turn had more complex economies with higher levels of growth, 
and more stability in their incomes. As countries have gone through industrialization they 
have also seen a rise in their rankings in the human development index of the United 
Nations (UNDP, 2011). 
There are many approaches to industrialization and that contest how 
industrialization may be initiated and sustained as well as the role of the state in this 
process. While some have argued that the government should be limited to establishing a 
system where imports are limited and local industries are developed in their place, others 
have argued that the state should not intervene in this process at all, but rather leave the 
process to market-forces for industrialization to occur 'naturally' through industries 
developing through the market to be internationally competitive. Further to this, others 
have demonstrated that the government needs to play an interventionist and directive role 
to control and guide investments while nurturing and developing industries for a strong 
industrial sector to develop in the economy. 
Mehjabeen Alarakhia 
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What is often misunderstood though is that EPZs do not result in industrial 
development based on the neoliberal approach where the state is required to play a 
minimalist role. Rather successes such as those of the Asian countries were a result of a 
high degree of regulation and direction when using EPZs with the state playing a very 
active role in industrial development. The EPZ programmes that are being introduced in 
developing countries currently are being brought in under economic reform policies that 
require states to deregulate their markets and liberalize their economies. Under these 
regimes, EPZs turn into a means to subsidize foreign companies to produce goods at a 
cheap rate as the cost of production is significantly reduced in EPZs through attractive 
incentive packages. As a result of this, many of these EPZs have failed to contribute to 
the industrial development of a country when implemented from a neoliberal perspective. 
Tanzania has launched the Tanzania Mini-Tiger Plan (2004) which plans for the 
country to be a middle income country by the year 2020 by replicating the successes of 
Asian countries that have gone attained rapid industrialization i.e. the Asian Tigers which 
are Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore and the Tiger Cub countries which 
are Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Philippines. This strategy proposes that through 
the widespread establishment of EPZs and/or Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Tanzania 
will replicate the strategies of the Asian Tiger countries to achieve the same levels of 
industrialization. Like many other developing countries, Tanzania has been compelled 
through its multilateral agreements to liberalize its economy and deregulate its markets 




However, the approach used by many of the Asian Tiger and Tiger Cub countries was 
one that using an Export Led Industrialization (ELI) model to develop the domestic 
economy. Thus Tanzania finds itself in a difficult position of wanting to emulate the 
Asian Tiger model which was highly interventionist while implementing a neoliberal 
approach. 
Theoretically, many EPZs have been established to increase export promotion, 
diversify the domestic industry base and increase employment opportunities within the 
country. This thesis will broadly examine the experiences of countries utilizing the EPZ 
approach under the neoliberal economic policies and will examine how the Asian 
countries have used EPZs successfully to industrialize. Based on the understanding of the 
policies utilized to attain the successful industrialization this thesis will examine the EPZ 
policies of Tanzania to determine if they could lead to the success of the Asian Tigers or 




LITERAT URE REVIEW 
Export Processing Zones 
Many countries are introducing or have introduced EPZs as a means of 
developing the industrial sector. EPZs were one of the main tools of industrialization 
utilized by the Asian Tigers (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore) and the 
Tiger Cubs (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Philippines). Many African countries are 
now trying to emulate the industrialization successes of the Asian countries by 
implementing EPZ strategies. As a result of the Asian Tigers success, EPZs are now 
being promoted in developing countries in almost the same way as neoliberal policies 
were promoted in the 1980s. However, despite the extensive literature on the policy 
alterations of the EPZ prescription by the Asian countries, the EPZ model that is being 
promoted is still the classic neo-liberal policy model. Therefore, it is important to 
understand the policies used by Asian Tigers in making the EPZs work. 
This section will review the potential benefits of the EPZ strategies with respect 
to increased foreign exchange earnings, diversification of the industrial sector, and 
increased decent employment. As each of these components is reviewed there will be a 
discussion on what the failures have been and how the Asian countries mitigated these 
failures through their policies. This will provide a framework for understanding the types 
of policies that must be in place to mitigate the potential negative outcomes of EPZ 
strategies and will therefore inform on what sorts of measures must be taken by the state 




component of the of the EPZ strategy promoted by neoliberal economists, FDI will be 
discussed in depth to understand the complexities it poses. 
The World Bank (1992) defines Export Processing Zones as: 
"fenced-in industrial estates specializing in manufacturing for exports that 
offer firms free trade conditions and a liberal regulatory environment" 
(World Bank, 1992:7). 
However the World Bank definition does not encompass all the various types of EPZs 
that have emerged. The first variation on this is that while all EPZs do have some sort of 
security system, they are not all fenced-in as the definition alludes to. Some EPZs do 
have a relatively unrestricted flow of people in and out of the premises; it is only the flow 
of goods that is restricted. In addition, in several countries EPZs can be situated outside 
designated zones (Mauritius, China, Madagascar, Tanzania) allowing for existing 
industrial sites to be converted into EPZs or for strategic location of EPZs such as in 
border zones or for the extraction of mineral resources (Madani, 1999). Secondly, despite 
the definition in several countries a certain percentage of the products produced in EPZs 
are made available on the local market (Dominican Republic, 20 percent; Mexico, 20 -
40%) (Madani, 1999). 
The final characteristic of these zones is the economic policies are distinctly 
different from those within the rest of the country in an effort to establish a truly liberal 
regulatory environment. Companies established within these zones are often given 




special exemptions to several laws, specifically those relating to worker rights and 
working conditions (Kusago and Tzannatos, 1998). For the purposes of this paper, a more 
inclusive definition of EPZs will be adopted as most EPZs have evolved into several of 
the variations defined above. Thus, for the purposes of this study EPZs will imply any 
zone or company which is in a fenced-in area, producing for export, with special 
incentives and where economic policies are different from the rest of the country. This 
definition will include special economic zones (SEZs), free trade zones (FTZs), 
Economic Development Zones (EDZs) and any other term that fits the conceptual 
definition stated above. There will be a distinction made, when required, if the discussion 
refers only to one or another kind of zone. 
The use of EPZs has exponentially increased throughout the world over the past 
20 years. The ILO reports that in 1975 only 25 countries were hosting a total of just 79 
EPZs (Boyenge, 2003). By 1997 the number of countries hosting EPZs had increased to 
93, with a total of 845 EPZs and employing a total of 22.5 million people globally. 
However in the five years from 1997 to 2002 there was as drastic increase in the number 
of EPZs. In 2002,23 more countries were hosting EPZs resulting in a total 116 countries 
hosting EPZs, with a total of 3000 EPZs and employing a total of 43 million worldwide 
(Boyenge, 2003). By 2006, it was reported that the number of countries hosting these 
zones had increased to 132 with the latest number of EPZs being reported at 5,174 
globally (World Economic Processing Zones Association, 2006). Almost all of these jobs 




numbers of these jobs with 40 million in over 2,000 EPZs (Boyenge, 2007). Sub-Saharan 
Africa had over 90 EPZs in 2006 (Boyenge, 2007), no doubt this number has increased 
significantly since then. More recent comprehensive data has not been collected however 
it is clear that almost every country in the world has EPZs and a large number of jobs are 
provided through them. 
It is estimated that there are only approximately 700 EPZs in the United States 
and Western Europe in 2005, and the rest were all in developing countries or emerging 
economies (FIAS, 2008). In 2005, of the remaining EPZs, it is estimated that 30% are in 
Latin America, 41% in East and Southern China, 10% in the Middle East and North 
African Region, and only 4% in sub-Saharan Africa (Farole, 2011). However, this data is 
relatively dated and a more recent synthesis has not been done. Additionally, many 
African countries initiated their EPZ programmes in the early 2000's so many of the 
Zones created in Africa could not have been captured in the 2005 data collection process. 
The same author estimates that in 2005, the total value of exports from EPZs in 
developing countries was approximately US$850 billion, which is slightly less than 20% 
of all exports from these countries (Farole, 2011). This illustrates that even at that time 
EPZs were already contributing disproportionately to the exports of developing countries. 
Despite EPZs contribution to export ratio, EPZs have not had such a pronounced 
effect on employment figures in developing countries. Although in terms of absolute 
numbers it is estimated that EPZs employed about 66million people around the world, in 




jobs (Farole, 2011). The nature of these jobs has often been called into question as EPZs 
tend to employ young women while providing low wages, poor job security, difficult 
working conditions, and require long working hours. 
EPZs have been developed in various forms. Several countries with more 
sophisticated EPZ programmes, have developed specialized EPZs, such as China have 
developed zones focused on high-technology products as in Shenzhen, the footwear 
industry in Wenzhou, or the textile cluster in Guangdong (Zeng, 2010). This has helped 
developed economies of scale and also to develop local expertise in a particular trade. In 
other places, the comparative advantage of a well located port has been used to develop a 
free port, and the local economy has benefited from developing warehousing and other 
transport services (Zeng, 2010). Globally however, EPZs have had a limited product 
range. Most EPZs focus on low or medium technology manufacturing which have little 
scope for technology transfer, or technology creation. Most products from EPZs have 
been concentrated in textile and clothing production (ILO, 1996); much of this has been 
fuelled by the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) which limited the quota of each developing 
country to export to developed countries. The MFA therefore required manufacturers of 
apparels to establish manufacturing activities in different countries so as to take 
advantage to the unused quotas. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 
the United States which succeeded the MFA allowed preferential access to US markets 
for apparel produced in African countries. 
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EPZs have been heavily promoted by the international finance institutions as a 
formula for rapid industrialization, as well as rapid liberalization. From a neoliberal 
perspective EPZs are seen as a second best policy option. The best policy option would 
be to implement country-wide neoliberal economic polices that would remove all 
distortions in the market and would allow the natural equilibriums to appear. However, in 
the case that this would be too much reform too quickly, EPZs are seen as testing 
laboratories where countries can implement reforms which can later be scaled up 
throughout the country. Amsden (2001) presents an alternative picture. Amsden (2001) 
proposes that the Asian Tiger and Tiger Cub countries did not use EPZs as testing 
grounds for neoliberal economic policies but rather EPZs were implemented to enable the 
country to export products and earn the necessary foreign exchange required for their 
balance of trade payments without compromising their local industries and market. Thus 
this model was using an Export Led Industrialization (ELI) model to develop the 
domestic economy. Similar is the case of Mauritius, where EPZs were not introduced to 
liberalize the market but rather as a means to create large scale employment for women 
without jeopardizing the local economy or the local wage rates (Rodrik, 2007). It is 
important to understand the distinctive approaches as this defines the types of 
interventions the state perceives itself as being able to implement. In many countries, 
EPZs were initially introduced as part of the S APs and most implementing governments 
see them as islands where pure neoliberal policies must be implemented, thus restricting 
the range of interventions that can be implemented (Amsden, 2001). 




Many developing countries that implement the EPZs' have economies that are 
reliant on a few basic agricultural products which then results in serious financial crises 
when the global markets for those crops falls or when weather conditions cause crop 
failures. With the introduction of EPZs governments hope to move away from the 
agriculturally reliant economy to an economy reliant on industrial goods that have higher 
and more stable global market prices and are not vulnerable to weather conditions. This 
can then ensure the government can have a steadier income of foreign exchange which is 
required to make necessary purchases on the international market (such as oil) as well for 
the purposes of debt-servicing. 
It is not a great leap to understand that industrialization requires investment. 
Countries have struggled to attract and sustain high levels of investment, both domestic 
and foreign, in industrialization. Studies have shown that outputs booms only after about 
five years of consistently high investment to GDP ratios for increased production, be it 
for domestic markets or for export (Rodrick, 1999 in Storm and Naastepad, 2005). Thus 
high levels of investment are required for long periods of time to see any significant 
change in the industrialization levels of a country. This can be extremely costly for 
governments, particularly those in low income countries that have several competing 
priorities simultaneously and a low capital base. 
Some of the most commonly used methods to finance industrialization are 
national budget support through subsidies, loans and grants, securing loans from 
- 1 1  -
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international finance institutions, acquiring aid for industrial development (tied or not) 
and through the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI). Budget support and loans 
from international finance institutions have been discussed else where in this document. 
An increasing interesting dynamic is China's investment in developing countries 
developing EPZs and SEZs. China's aid is not commonly direct financing, but rather is 
through the provision of service to develop infrastructure through Chinese construction 
companies and the provision of technical assistance in developing strategies and policies. 
There has been an increasing trend in the involvement of Chine in developing EPZs 
especially in Africa over the past 10 years (Berthelemy, 2011). The key financing 
mechanism that will be discussed in this section is FDI. 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Neoliberal proponents of the EPZ strategy suggest that FDI can be utilized to fund 
the establishment of industries, to invest in the required technology, and to develop the 
capacity of the labour force required for industrialization. In an effort to attract foreign 
investment governments provide superior services for companies establishing within the 
EPZs (Warr, 1989). Despite the challenges of providing electricity and running water for 
their population, governments provide all of these at an international standard and a 
subsidized rate within the EPZs. Governments will also go to great lengths to develop 
transport infrastructure such as sea ports, roads, railways and airports to facilitate the 
- 1 2 -
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export process. This not only illustrates a bias towards the foreign companies but results 
in a significant cost for the government who not only has to invest in the establishment of 
these services but then has to continually fund the subsidies to them (Warr, 1989). 
With the growing popularity of EPZs globally, countries find themselves 
competing against each other for a limited supply of international capital. As a result each 
country attempts to create a more attractive investment environment by providing as 
many incentives as possible (Amirahmadi and Wu, 1995). It is argued however, that these 
attempts produce a net result of cancelling out any potential benefits the country could 
have gained from the EPZs initially. Similarly, developing countries seeking FDI often 
find themselves competing against each other for investment. The international mobility 
of FDI further exacerbates this and ignites a 'race to the bottom' between countries. Each 
country attempting to court FDI attempts to develop a more attractive investment climate 
and minimizes the potential benefits for its own economy in the process. 
One of the primary criticisms for the introduction of FDI focused EPZs within 
developing countries is the proliferation of the dependence of developing countries on 
developed nations and trans-national corporations. This re-establishes the centre-
periphery relationship that the dependency theorists had criticized and that developing 
countries had sought respite from in their early post-independence period (see discussion 
on Import Substitution Industrialization). 
It is argued that as the number of EPZs grows within any particular country so 
does the dependence of the economy of that country upon those EPZs. This then impacts 
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the governments' regulatory capacities within the country and legislation to regulate the 
foreign firms becomes harder to establish and implement. In the example of Mexico 
where almost 2 million workers are employed in the maquiladoras, the adoption of any 
legislation that results in the decline in the amount of factories within the EPZs could 
result in mass unemployment as well as an immediate decline in the export earning of the 
state creating a tremendous shock to the economy similar to that of the East Asian 
economic crisis of 1997 (Bacon, 2004). In addition, with the resulting mass 
unemployment governments could face a significant amount of civil unrest making the 
situation more tenuous. Cases have been reported where despite poor working conditions 
workers do not want their governments to impose stricter regulations for fear of jobs 
being lost of the factory closes down and relocates. The state's resulting inability to 
regulate the Trans-National Corporations (TNCs) implies that the state would not be able 
to prevent any exploitation that may be occurring as a result of the TNCs' activities such 
as the exploitation of the labour force, or the exploitation of natural resources or the 
distinction of the environment. 
Historical analysis presented by Chang (2002,2004) has demonstrated that in 
most of the now-developed countries, FDI was heavily controlled. Some of the biggest 
proponents of FDI are currently, the US, many of the European countries, and even some 
of the Asian countries such as Japan. Throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s, 
economists in these countries were very critical of any sort of foreign ownership of their 
industries. The scepticism resulted from the lack of trust on the intentions of the foreign 
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investors. In most cases, foreign ownership of any company was capped at a ceiling level 
and in the majority of cases foreign investors were not allowed voting privileges in 
company decision making processes. Similarly, foreign investment in land was banned in 
many places through legislation (Chang, 2002). 
A case in point is the Irish experience as discussed by Chang (2002, and 2004). 
Ireland is usually given credit as the first countries to introduce EPZs as an 
industrialization strategy. Even in this initial period Ireland's original approach to FDI 
was a neoliberal approach. FDI was favoured as it was assumed that foreign firms were 
more export oriented. Ireland did establish some performance requirements on investors 
but also provided investment grants to manufacturing firms. After almost 20 years of 
implementing such a strategy the FDI continued to be in low value added sectors, few 
linkages to local firms had been made and employment in local firms continued to 
decline. In the mid-1980s the Irish government recognized the limits to FDI and decided 
to take a more interventionist approach to industrial development. Contrary to the 
neoliberal teachings, a more directed approach to improving the performance of domestic 
manufacturing firms through selective state support and incentives to overcome 
disadvantages and weaknesses of these local firms was implemented. Domestic firms 
were monitored using performance-related targets in order to qualify for capital grants 
and other financing mechanisms. This support was not extended to foreign firms. As a 
result of this change in approach there was an increase in high quality FDI with more 
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linkages between the domestic and foreign manufacturers emerging, and there was also a 
marked increase in manufacturing employment in both domestic and foreign firms. 
In the more recent experience of the Asian countries, FDI was initially banned 
entirely, particularly in Japan (Chang, 2002). When the restrictions on FDI were finally 
relaxed, the process was very slow and gradual. In some sectors, foreign ownership was 
limited to a maximum of 50% with joint ventures being allowed only with Japanese 
companies who were already experienced in the same line of production. Boards of 
directors were required to constitute at least 50% Japanese representation and brownfield 
investments were not allowed. 
Historically, similar experiences have taken place in many of the now developed 
countries. FDI had generally been controlled and directed in the early industrialization 
phase (Chang, 2002). The experience has shown that the liberalization of FDI should 
only occur at a stage when industrial growth has already been started - and even at that 
point liberalization should be limited and the process should be gradual. However, 
despite these experiences, countries that are now implementing industrialization 
strategies are being compelled to do so with a neoliberal approach to FDI with no 
restriction or control of FDI. 
EPZs were originally envisioned as a means to accelerate the development the 
domestic industry base within any particular country. In the neoliberal model of EPZs the 
main focus has been shifted from developing local industries to attracting foreign direct 
investment (FDI) for the development of industries. When companies were domestic in 
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nature, the access to working capital, tax breaks and duty drawbacks could be seen as 
investments by the state in the industrial sector. However, when the firms are foreign 
firms, these incentives act like subsidies foreign companies resulting in a net loss of 
capital from the country (Amsden, 2001). 
When goods are produced in any industry within the country and exported, the 
government is the net earner of foreign exchange. This is theoretically also true for 
factories that may be operating with EPZs. However, the neoliberal approach requires 
that there is no control on the mobility of capital. Countries are encouraged to attract 
foreign direct investment (FDI) as the major type of investment in EPZs as these foreign 
firms will bring with them advanced technology and know how that will contribute to the 
diversification of the industrial sector (see next section). Therefore as the firms are 
foreign firms operating in a neoliberal environment, companies have full privileges to 
repatriate all their earnings and profits out of the host economy therefore there is little or 
no contribution to the balance of trade challenges the country may be facing. 
As incentive for investing within the EPZs (and as a tenet of neoliberal 
economics) governments commonly grant an initial period within which the corporation, 
either local or foreign, is exempted for almost all domestic taxes (5-10 years depending 
on country). Although it has long been proposed that the tax incentives in EPZs are key 
to attracting investors, a recent World Bank study found that reduced taxes are just as 
effective as tax exemptions in attracting investment and reduced taxes are correlated with 
higher growth and investment (Farole, 2011). The study suggests that this difference was 
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because foreign investors who establish companies in EPZs are not infant industries; 
hence they do not need the total protection from taxes as infant industries do. To these 
companies, taxes are a part of the operating cost and many of these companies pay taxes 
in their home economies. However, tax incentives are extremely useful in establishing 
new infant industries and should be considered an option in encouraging local industrial 
diversification (James, 2009). 
In developing countries where individual personal income for the majority of the 
population is well below the poverty line, the personal income tax base is weak and an 
inadequate source of funding for the government. Therefore, governments often rely on 
the corporate tax base for revenue within which the export tax revenue is the greatest. 
However, with the case of tax exemptions in EPZs, often the only tax paid by the EPZ 
company is indirectly through the personal income tax of its employees. Thus the tax 
holidays granted to these EPZ investors who primarily focus on production for export 
severely reduce the government's revenue base while increasing profits for the 
corporation. In addition to this, when the initial tax exemption period is over and 
corporations are subject to paying taxes, it is not uncommon for corporations use transfer 
pricing so as to minimize declared earnings thus minimizing the amount of taxes paid to 
the host country, alternatively, corporations move to new EPZs and being their tax 
holiday again (James, 2009). 
While the EPZs have lot of potential to earn foreign exchange for the balance of 
trade this has not been the common experience in most developing countries 
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(Amirahmadi and Wu, 1995). Most EPZ firms are international manufacturing firms that 
import most of their raw materials and then export the finished value added products. As 
such, the end result is often that the net foreign exchange earning is much lower than 
originally anticipated (Warr, 1989). In addition, when these EPZ firms are foreign firms 
profits are repatriated out of EPZ host countries hence the earning potential is further 
decreased (foreign direct investment will be discussed in more detail in a later section). 
As more and more developing countries introduce EPZs, countries and indeed 
zones within countries begin to compete with each other to attract foreign capital. This 
ignites the 'race to the bottom' where countries try to reduce the cost of production in 
their zones in an effort to make their zone more attractive (Amirahmadi and Wu, 1995). 
As more attractive EPZs are developed, countries risk having empty zones, therefore to 
maintain their comparative advantage countries with zones find themselves unable to 
negotiate for increased revenue from companies operating within their own zones. 
However, as the Asian countries have demonstrated, if part of the focus of the zones is 
maintained on local industry development, there are several interventions that could be 
undertaken to encourage these industries to export their products. Unfortunately, in many 
of the EPZ programmes being implemented currently, local investors do not get the same 
privileges as foreign investors thus the programmes in reality discourage local industry. 
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Diversification ofDomestic Industry 
It is expected that through the introduction of the technical know-how from 
foreign companies, countries that may not ordinarily be able to engage in research to 
develop technology can benefit and produce developed goods for the global market (Rhee 
1990; Rhee and Belot, 1990). One of the ways in which the EPZs are envisioned in 
helping the economy is through the establishment of linkages between the industries 
within the EPZs and those in the local economy. Backward linkages refer to the raw 
materials and intermediate goods the EPZs draw from the local economy. In the 
theoretical model of EPZs, foreign companies would be partners with local investors 
either directly or through the supply chain. This therefore would require the local firms to 
enhance the products they are producing to ensure their products meet global market 
standards in order to ensure the international firm buys from the local firm and not from 
another international supplier. Already this would have a positive impact of encouraging 
local suppliers to better the quality of the goods they produce. In addition, the local firms 
will also have to increase the amount produced to meet the needs of a large manufacturer 
in the EPZ therefore also developing economies of scale and increasing profits. It is also 
proposed that the through this partnership local firms will be provided with in-roads into 
international markets through the international firm - in-roads that would otherwise not 
be available to the local firm. 
Proponents of the EPZ strategy suggest the establishment of these zones will 
encourage local industries to manufacture and provide inputs; however it must be noted 
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that the import intensive nature of EPZ production limits the potential of outsourcing to 
the local economy (Amirahmadi and Wu, 1995). In addition, it is proposed that the local 
economy will also benefit from the techniques and technologies of the foreign firm. This 
will happen as the local workers get employed and trained with the EPZs, as these 
employees get released back into the local economy with the skills they acquired in the 
EPZs and these would then be transferred to the local economy. Additionally, because 
most EPZ jobs are targeted towards a young and generally unskilled labour force, 
proponents suggest that these jobs will train and discipline the workforce instilling in 
them a good work ethic (Amirahmadi and Wu, 1995). This seems to be somewhat 
presumptuous and somewhat Eurocentric in the assumption that these individuals are lazy 
(Chang, 2009). As Chang points out, similar criticisms were made of the Japanese 
population before its miracle economic development. 
Although the neoliberal model assumes that these linkages and developments will 
happen 'magically' as market mechanisms are allowed to function, the experience of 
most developing countries with EPZs shows that these have not materialized in reality. 
Some proponents of neoliberal economics have proposed that it takes a long time for 
these benefits to materialize and that the short term pain needs to be experienced in order 
to achieve a long term gain. The Asian and Latin American countries recognized these 
changes would not happen by default and as such introduced specific and targeted 





Of particular interest in this respect is the example of EPZs in Mauritius which 
had been a monocrop economy in the 1960s when it experienced a population boom. The 
country had a small but vibrant economic sector including some industrial production that 
had enjoyed a protected market since independence in 1968. During the 1970s, the 
Mauritian government embarked upon an EPZ strategy so that almost all good are 
exported to develop its industry base for export because the small local market would not 
be able to consume the products of a large industrial sector. The government introduced 
EPZs to protect local industries from international competition while allowing foreign 
investment which resulted in both the creation of jobs as well as the stimulation of the 
local economy through indirect income streams (Rodrik, 2007). This illustrates how the 
establishment of the EPZs can lead to the expansion of the local economy if the 
government plays an active role in monitoring and regulating the investors' activities. 
Specifically in the Asian countries, there was a constant monitoring of the types 
of technology that was being imported. There was a system to ensure that obsolete 
technology was not being imported. Similarly, the government negotiated and enforced a 
mandatory training programme for certain companies. Industries that grew beyond a 
stipulated size were required to provide training to their staff to ensure there was enough 
of a skill base in the country for that industry. Thus, a systematic mechanism to upgrade 
skills and transfer knowledge was established (Amirahmadi and Wu, 1995). 
In China, industry specific EPZs were established. As a mechanism to ensure 




partnerships between EPZs and local universities. As students got opportunities to 
research and learn about business strategies, they also learnt about industry specific 
technology and technological advances (Zeng, 2010). Thus a local knowledge base was 
built through design and not by default. Similarly, in South Korea's Massan EPZ, 4000 
workers were trained in electronics and chemicals deliberately through a requirement by 
the state. This again illustrates that technology and skills transfer does not occur by 
default. Also, the industries being developed must be those that require some level of 
technology to be utilized such as electrical equipment manufacturing, industrial chemical 
production, metallurgy and rubber (Amirahmadi and Wu, 1995). 
As seen above, the technology required to diversify exports cannot just be 
transplanted from other countries with the expectation that local industries will learn how 
to use it. Developing countries need to invest in human as well as physical capital to 
diversity their industry base and to ensure the exports can be competitive on the global 
market. In addition, these policies often need to be monitored and deliberately 
implemented on the part of the government as seen in the Asian miracle countries. 
Although the argument in support of EPZs suggests that this strategy will draw 
the domestic firms into international trade, the opposite is also possible. The introduction 
of a large international trans-national corporation would have devastating effects for a 
smaller local firm that may be operating in the country (Amsden, 2001). Large 
international firms often produce large quantities with advanced technology and therefore 




more labour intensive methods and thus have a higher cost of production. The 
introduction of the international firm would consequently jeopardize the sustainability of 
the domestic firm. Supporters of the EPZ strategy would argue this is merely the work of 
the market in ensuring that the most efficient means of production is achieved. However, 
the elimination of the domestic firm defies the purpose of introducing EPZs in the first 
place as it undermines the domestic industries instead of producing an environment 
where they can prosper. Furthermore, the neoliberal EPZ supporters would argue that as 
the EPZ firms are only allowed to sell a small percentage (20%-30%) of their products on 
the local market the local manufacturers would not be negatively affected as this would 
encourage competition and efficiency in production. However, when comparing the 
magnitude of production, the EPZ producers are expected to be producing for a global 
market and thus 20% of their production may be much more than the consumptive 
capacity of the local market within which they would sell their products and therefore, 
hindering the success of local producers (Farole, 2011). 
Upon studying the experiences of EPZs in various countries, it has been found 
that the nature of EPZ manufacturing often implies that this strategy is extremely import 
intensive (Amirahmadi and Wu, 1995). With the spread of the new international division 
of labour in the post-fordist era, most EPZs tend to merely be assembly plants putting 
together various parts of a product in order to capitalize on the comparative advantages of 
cheap labour in the host countries (Baldoz et al, 2001). As a result there is little 




there is little technology involved to be transferred. Additionally, while most TNCs do 
conduct research and development activities, this research is ordinarily conducted in the 
home country where a knowledge economy exists and not in the host country 
(Amirahmadi and Wu, 1995). Thus the spill over effects of this technology development 
does not commonly impact the local host economy. 
Foreign investors prefer to import goods from globally competitive companies. 
This allows for a guarantee of quality as well as price. From a critics perspective this also 
allows the foreign firm to relocate as and when it sees fit without disrupting its business 
connections (Chang, 2009). This has been an increasing problem as the number of export 
processing zones has increased globally. Committing to local suppliers means that 
companies must first invest in local technological and manufacturing know-how which is 
a costly exercise in itself. Secondly, if companies move across boarders they must re­
develop these local suppliers or else import from the suppliers in the former country. The 
final barrier to allowing linkages to happen is the enclave nature of EPZs. Locally 
purchased goods must be imported into the customs bounded enclave of the EPZ hence 
making it more expensive then the import the inputs from other countries because 
imports from the local market are not duty free. Hence, the incentives of the EPZ scheme 
introduced to attract foreign manufactures in reality act as disincentives for the same 
EPZs to buy from local producers (Amirahmadi and Wu, 1995). 
In order to ensure that local companies were not left out of the industrialization 




done in at least three ways. The use of local content was used in Asian and Latin 
American countries as a condition for access to credit. Governments established a 
minimum requirement of local content in an exported product such as in Brazil where the 
requirement was being 90%-95% of local content. However, in Brazil this proved to be 
unsustainable as it required technocrats to know in detail the production procedures to 
understand which industry should be pushed to source good locally. Similarly, it was 
difficult to judge in some industries the amount of local content being utilized, especially 
is a portion of the goods were allowed to be imported. Finally, local content is often not 
globally competitive in terms of price as well as quality and this is increasing problematic 
as foreign direct investment increases in export industries (Amsden, 2001). The second 
method that was used was banning the export of an unprocessed product. In the case of 
Indonesia, wood was banned from being exported in its raw form and had to be process 
to a minimum level of plywood before it could be exported (Amsden, 2001). The third 
method that has been used, although not in recent years, was in Tanzania where tax 
exemptions for imported inputs were only granted for inputs that were not available from 
local producers and that were going to be used for export products (Rutman, 1968). 
The neoliberal approach to diversification of the local industry base has been 
proven to be ineffective. While the approaches that have been used in some countries 
seem demanding and complicated to implement, they are required if the country intends 




Decent Employment Creadon 
Aside from the revenue generating aspects of EPZs, these zones are intended to 
provide large scale employment in labour surplus economies (Kusago and Tzannatos, 
1998). As the agriculture sector becomes more efficient and more workers are made 
available for employment in other sectors thus many developing countries are faced with 
a growing unemployed population (Lewis, 1954). Thus, with the establishment of EPZ 
factories it is expected that a large number of jobs will be created in the industrial sector 
providing both skills development for those employed within them as well as income. It 
is expected that indirect jobs resulting from the EPZ activities and employment will 
double or triple the income streams outside the EPZ being provided from the direct jobs 
within EPZs. The issue within the EPZ discussions however lies in the quality of the jobs 
being provided. As neoliberal theories propose attempts to control the quality of jobs 
being provided would be interventionist and would distort the magic of the market. 
Neoliberal economists propose instead the basic supply and demand model proposing 
that when the availability of labour goes down, the quality of jobs will improve. 
The Labour Surplus Economy 
Sir Arthur Lewis (1954) proposed that as the agriculture sector undergoes 
technological advancement worker productivity will increase thus decreasing the demand 
for labour within this sector. In most developing countries, the agriculture sector has been 




thus this increased productivity will release vast numbers of people, making them 
available for employment in other sectors. However, societies in which non-agricultural 
sectors are underdeveloped the release of labour usually results in an increase in the 
unemployment rate resulting in the existence of a large amount of surplus labour. Based 
on the basic economic postulate of supply and demand, die cost of labour drops as the 
number of individuals seeking employment supersedes the number of available 
employment opportunities. With the strain that this puts on the social system, 
governments are increasingly pressured to provide jobs. 
Especially, in least developed countries (LDCs) many labourers are bound to their 
employers as widespread unemployment or seasonal employment makes workers heavily 
dependant on employers to remain employed. It is argued that it was precisely due to the 
shortages of labour in the developed world, that the working conditions as well as the 
wages are much higher compared to LDCs. Furthermore, in most LDCs the majority of 
the population works either in agriculture or in the subsistence sector (Lewis, 1954). The 
low level of wages in the formal sector implies workers will continue to have a 
subsistence level livelihood, being unable to save or reinvest into the economy (Lewis, 
1954). Based on the neo-liberal model, the low wages the workers receive implies that 
these workers are unable to purchase die goods they make. As a result, the levels of 
consumption in the economy remain low, thus production is limited to, and targeted for, 
export. This however, limits the growth potential of the economy as the savings rate is 




the facilities that they do, labour must be productive beyond the minimum subsistence 
level, with each individual producing more than what they consume for there to exist a 
surplus to invest. Thus it is proposed that in societies where there is an abundance of 
labour, the employment standards of labour suffer as a result and the economy will still 
be unable to grow (Lewis, 1954). It is therefore imperative that governments find a 
mechanism to increase the incomes of their people. 
Feminization of the EPZ workforce 
There is a disproportionate representation of young women workers, often under 
the age of 25, who work within these EPZs (Boyenge, 2003). This is a trend that has 
emerged in almost all EPZs throughout the world (Boyenge, 2003). Employers propose 
women employees are better suited to carry out the detail oriented work required in these 
factories, especially in the electronics and textile sectors. Some authors have also 
proposed that employers prefer to employ women because they are less likely to resist the 
authority of the employer, they can be hired at a lower wage than men, and because they 
tend to work for short periods of time (until they get married or become mothers) and are 
not searching for career development opportunities or job security (Kusago and 
Tzannatos, 1998). An alternate explanation has been proposed for the over representation 
of women. It is suggested that the only other form of employment available to women is 




the other hand have employment options in the formal sector and thus choose not to work 
in EPZs (Kusago and Tzannatos, 1998). 
Decent Work 
Most countries have a definition of the minimum standard which must be met at 
any place of employment, as well as some industry specific employment standards. The 
International Labour Organization (ILO) has developed a decent work agenda (ILO, 
2011). This agenda provides a basic list of criteria that individuals strive to attain in their 
working lives. The strategic objectives for the decent work agenda are the availability of 
employment opportunities with decent hours which provide adequate earnings and 
productive work; the entitlement to paid time off including annual leave, compassionate 
days off and maternity leave; stability and security of work; equal opportunity and 
treatment in employment; safe work environment including access to healthcare; and 
entitlement to social security; and social dialogue, workers' and employers representation 
that can increase productivity and avoid disputes (ELO, 2011). 
In 1976, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
published the International Investment and Multilateral Enterprises Declaration, which 
contained guidelines to encourage a positive contribution by TNCs to the economic and 
social progress of the countries within which they choose to locate (Perman et al., 2004). 
In 2000, the OECD governments amended this declaration to align it with the ILO 




countries must extend the national labour laws to the EPZ areas. Initially, EPZs had 
several exemptions on the labour standards and laws, however as a result of these global 
agreements exemptions are no longer permitted. 
Despite having good policies on paper countries often fail to enforce them 
sufficiently within these zones. This has been the case in Mexico where despite having 
one of the most developed labour legislations in the world, the workers in the 
maquiladoras must accept an inferior working environment because the government 
chooses to accommodate the needs of the investors' rather then workers (ICFTU, 2003). 
Similarly, the most governments around the world have legislated minimum 
standards which stipulate the number of hours within a work week. Any worker who 
works more then the stipulated number of hours much be paid a premium overtime rate 
for each additional hour of work (Perman, et al., 2004). However, because of the vacuum 
of regulation within EPZs, many workers work more then the national work week 
without being compensated for it. In addition, many times workers within EPZs are paid 
a 'piece rate' for each unit they produce, or are expected to produce a required daily 
quota (Madani, 1999). In these situations workers are not paid an hourly wage at all, thus 
employers do not care how long it takes workers to complete the work as long as the 
quota is met. The major drawback of this strategy is that often time workers will work for 
10 or 12 hours a day to complete their required quotas (ICFTU, 2003). Studies have 
shown however, that the longer hours that these workers work, the more fatigued they 




the workers are more likely to get seriously injured while at work thus putting at risk their 
health and safety, as well as their future employability. 
The problem however arises due to the exemptions from the labour laws of the 
companies established within these zones. These exemptions imply that those working 
within these zones are essentially working in a completely deregulated environment where 
there exists no means of ensuring a minimum labour standard. It is important to note here 
that as these are not local firms, it is difficult for the government to hold them accountable 
and insurance companies may or may not be accessible to the worker if they were injured. 
Thus while these jobs may be providing income to those lhat would otherwise be 
unemployed or those employed in the informal sector, the social costs of working in these 
EPZs coupled with the minimal economic benefit call into question the developmental 
contribution of this form of employment (Cling et al, 2005). The low wages of the workers 
implies workers would be unable to save or consume goods, thus the extent of the income 
stream provided is questionable. The domestic market remains small and profits for local 
firms also remain small due to the resulting low levels of consumption. A recent World 
Bank study finds that it is higher wages (not lower) that correlate to higher growth and 
investment (Farole, 2011). There do exist some studies that claim that wages of EPZ 
workers surpass those of non-EPZ workers in the same country and in the same sector, 
however many have argued that this statistical appearance is a result of long working 
hours that defy the maximum work week allowance, or a result of workers taking extra 




piece meal contracts (Kusago and Tzannatos, 1998). However the net result of the low 
wages is that while these zones could potentially be contributing to the growth of the 
economy, the exemptions to foreign firms often hinder the manifestation of any of these 
gains. 
In the case of Mauritius, two particular interventions are interesting and need to 
be discussed. As the introduction of the EPZ strategy in Mauritius was voluntary and not 
required by any external actors, the government was about to develop the programme as 
was most appropriate for its people. In order to mitigate the known adverse effects on 
health and social welfare through employment in the EPZs the government established a 
EPZ Labour Welfare Fund (now the Manufacturing Labour Welfare Fund) which 
provides funding for day care and education services for children of EPZ workers, and 
leisure activities for EPZ workers and their families. This fund was contributed to on a 
monthly basis by both EPZ operating firms as well as employees of EPZs based on 
profits and incomes (Rodrik, 2007). 
Mauritius being an island state had a limited number of employment opportunities 
in the local market. The government wanted to provide employment for women without 
disrupting the employment opportunities available for men. This was one of the 
objectives of the EPZ programme that was implemented. Knowing that EPZs tend to 
employ women, Mauritius utilized this as an affirmative action opportunity for women. 
In some cases the financial exemptions in zones have prompted companies to 




of no new jobs created, thus merely shifting jobs and defying the EPZ objective of job 
creation. Many EPZ programmes now require investments to be new investments to be 
eligible for EPZ status thus in many situations this issue is being addressed. 
Poor working conditions within the zones have long term repercussions on the 
health of the workers. Once the workers health deteriorates they will have no savings and 
with no social programs being provided in the country these workers are left as burdens 
on their extended families, again causing stresses on those who are in the workforce, 
spreading resources thin, and causing an inability to break out of the poverty cycle. 
Because of the 'race to the bottom' of EPZs these standards are often not enforced 
or waived entirely, thus employees work in a vacuum where there are few, if any, 
government regulated minimum standards and there is often little regard for workers 
health and safety. However, if the investment is a local industry, labour laws are not 
exempted thus protecting both the country's financial resources as well as its people. 
Again, the neoliberal policy prescriptions create an environment that is potentially 
hazardous to the populations that work within the EPZs. Some mitigation strategies have 
been developed and utilized very successfully in some EPZ programmes and should be 
utilized in other countries. 
Export Processing Zones and Industrialization 
Countries have struggled with industrialization strategies from the pre-industrial 




period if European industrialization there was no previous global experience on how to 
industrialize, or what fiscal and economic policies promote growth and facilitate 
investment. Even the benefits of industrialization at this point were unknown fully, all 
that was known is that mechanising processing will make the processes easier, increase 
productivity, and cost effectiveness. The process of European industrialization took 
approximately 200 years (Chang, 2002). 
Many of the proponents of 20th century industrialization argue that with the right 
policies and the creation of the right environment, the 200 year industrialization process 
that Europe underwent can be speeded up. No doubt, the Latin American countries 
seemed to have accomplished this process in a period of 50 years and some of the Asian 
countries have taken even less time. 
In order to speed up this process the main challenge that state policymakers face 
is how to sufficiently create an environment that stimulates industrial development 
without compromising the other sectors of the economy or society. This section will 
review the literature on three approaches to industrialization: Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI), Export Led Industrialization (ELI), and the mixed economy 
approach. These models have been selected as they have been used by many countries to 
various degrees of success. The objective is not to analyse all the literature with regard to 
these approaches as this is beyond the scope of this paper but to understand the context 




Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) 
Although ISI strategies had been used in title industrialization of many countries 
for over 200 years, it was only in the 1950s and 1960s that the concept was formally 
articulated and written about. The structuralist school of thought emerged mainly from 
Latin America and the dependency school to which they belong was informed by global 
events during that period including the independence of many African countries 
(Martinussen, 1997). The dependency theorists proposed that economies at the 
peripheries of the global chain of production remained underdeveloped because their 
products were mainly unprocessed goods which have a low value. These economies were 
developed as providing the raw materials that were exported to the economies at the 
centre where most of the processing and manufacturing took place. These processed 
goods where then sold back to the economies at the periphery at a price several times 
higher than what it was bought for because value had been added to the product through 
the processing. Thus the major profits were retained in the economy at the centre where 
the processing happened. In order for the periphery economies to re-import and consume 
value added products, the economy must have the capital to buy the products. However, 
due to the low earnings from the export of unprocessed goods, these economies are 
consistently faced with a deficit in their trade budgets due to a scarcity of the required 
foreign exchange. 
At the onset of independence several developing countries (usually at the 




of the newly independent countries found themselves with populations that had low skill 
levels, low levels of formal employment and low levels of productivity. Some countries 
were endowed with high levels of natural resources but lacked the technical, human and 
capital resources to extract these natural resources and to benefit economically from 
them. Thus, leaders were faced with a challenge of how to industrialize rather why to 
industrialize. The structuralists proposed that to overcome the problem of the uneven 
terms of trade was to produce industrialized goods in the periphery countries. This would 
also decrease the dependency on the centre that had been created through centuries of 
colonization. 
It is not surprising that most economies that emerged in the post-independence 
period were modeling similar systems with strong centralized state control rather than the 
neoliberal economic policies implemented in later times. Krugman (1995) states that at 
the time "... it was widely taken for granted that centrally planned economies, whatever 
their other weaknesses, were good at generating industrial growth." 
Prebish (1959:252) also proposed that "industrialization is an inescapable part of 
the process of change accompanying a gradual improvement in per capita income". From 
the experiences of Britain, Germany and others this had been evident (Chang, 2002). 
Countries in the periphery were often producing and exporting primary commodities 
while countries at the centre, the more developed countries, were producing 
industrialized goods. Primary commodities do not have as much value on the global 




The economic system during the colonial periods in Africa, Latin America, the 
Caribbean and Asia established a centre-periphery relationship with little benefits to 
colonized populations. There were high levels of international trade, which were mainly 
based on a system of extraction and forced production benefiting the colonizers 
economies. Most systems were centralized with high taxation rates to fund the 
infrastructure developments that in turn facilitated the transport of goods from the 
periphery to the centre. Competition by local merchants, such as local farmers who 
wanted to grow coffee, was systematically discouraged and in some cases colonial 
industrialists were allowed to exist as monopolies. 
After centuries of colonization, many of these leaders were faced with a popular 
demand to reduce the dependence on the former colonial powers. Many developed a 
popular development strategy where economic development focused on the people and 
that would change the center-periphery imbalance. 
The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) formally 
proposed ISI as a means of stimulating domestic industry. It was proposed that 
government must implement specific policies to support key capital inputs for 
industrialization through introducing: 
"Protective tariffs and/or exchange controls; special preferences for 
domestic and foreign firms importing capital goods for new industries; 
preferential import exchange rates for industrial raw materials, fuels and 
intermediate goods; cheap loans by government development banks for 
favored industries; the construction by governments of infrastructure 
especially designed to complement industries; and the direct participation 




as steel, where neither domestic nor foreign private capital was willing or 
able to invest (Baer, 1972: 98). 
For newly-independent countries pursuing an Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) model meant an economy that would allow the infant industrial 
sector to develop by providing it a confirmed market that would by products and enable 
to industries to develop in a protected market until their products are good enough and 
until the economies of scale have been achieved for them to be competitive on the global 
market. In addition, the ISI model provided much needed relief to the problem of 
balancing payments in situations of low foreign exchange as only essential industrial 
inputs would need to be imported. Bruton (904:1998) states "To industrialize, given the 
existence of already industrialized and highly productive economies (the North), the 
countries of the South must protect their economies from imports from the North and 
concentrate on putting in place new activities that will produce an array of manufactured 
products currently imported". 
Many countries adopted the ISI strategy to varying degrees in the 1960s and 
1970s, and many of these countries saw some growth in their manufacturing sectors 
during this time (Easterly, 2001). However, many countries also experienced significant 
challenges when utilizing the ISI strategy leading to much debate on the effectiveness of 
the model in achieving industrial growth. 
One of the challenges being faced at this juncture was the nature of goods being 




more efficient in production by protecting local markets from foreign competition. 
Although, export was not discouraged, the ISI strategy provides little incentive for export 
because it guarantees an available market for consumption. Thus, during the 
implementation of the ISI strategies, for most countries, the make up of exports did not 
significantly change from the traditionally exported unprocessed agricultural products. 
Krueger (1980) as the balance of payments became more strained, countries focus on 
saving foreign exchange and reducing imports while they should have focused on 
diversifying their exports. Rodick (2006) argues that countries must produce non-
traditional goods in order to attain higher earnings and experience the growth effects -
many of these require higher levels of technology and capital investment. Diversification 
of the export base would make countries more resilient to shocks in the global markets. 
While the aim of the ISI approach is to develop the local industries, it provided little 
opportunity for the country to earn foreign exchange to buy required inputs for industry 
as the economy is not producing goods for export. 
The oil shocks of the 1970s are attributed as the key events that negatively 
affected many of the countries utilizing ISI at the time. As the newly-independent 
countries utilized scarce foreign exchange earnings to buy fuel, the oil shocks of the 
1970s, resulted in extreme increases in the prices of oil. As much of the industrial 
development depended on oil-fuels, many countries started facing into balance of 
payments crises as earnings from exports could not create enough capital to buy the 




international finance institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank Group (WB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Critics of the ISI strategy proposed that the failure of the ISI strategy to bring 
about development was not due to the shocks of the 1970s but rather due to an inherent 
flaw in the approach. The ISI strategy required a number of what neo-liberals call market 
distorting interventions such as tariffs, import licenses, exchange controls and inflated 
exchange rates (Burton, 1998). It is argued that these interventions distort the efficient 
market systems making the manufacturing sector unable to compete with international 
producers (Bhagwati, 1978). 
The ISI approach created an environment for the implementing state what is 
similar to that which existed during the time of the European industrialization allowing 
industries to develop their own technology for production. However, ISI did not take into 
consideration that many of Europe's imports during its industrialization period were 
relatively inexpensive raw materials and most of the technology being used was simple 
non-oil-fuel based technology. In the case of the newly independent countries pursing ISI 
strategies in the 1960s and 1970s, manufacturing methods had evolved and were 
primarily oil-fuel based. Hence, the ISI strategies needed to be able to cater for the need 
for earning foreign exchange as a necessary industrial input. In the absence of this, there 
would consistently exist a crisis in the balance of payments. 
The newly independent countries needed an approach to industrialization that 




to develop without a reliance on external factors. The required time for such industrial 
development to occur is significant, and the ISI strategies could not provide significant 
foreign exchange earnings during the period when industries were developing despite the 
inherent need for oil-fuels during this time. As a result, although the ISI approach is what 
was used by most European and American economies, the newly independent countries 
could not use this approach because of the impact of the oil shocks of the 1970s on the 
prices of fuel oil. Thus the viability of the ISI approach to result in industrialization in the 
latter part of the 20th was unable to be determined as many of the countries had to 
abandon their ISI strategies in order to survive economically. It did demonstrate however, 
that any industrialization strategy must include a mechanism to earn significant amounts 
of foreign exchange from the onset so that die required oil-fuel imports can be acquired 
for industrialization. 
Export Led Industrialization (ELI) 
Development policy took a turn in the 1980s. A general trend was seen with many 
developing countries abandoning the ISI strategies they had previously been committed 
to and adopting ELI strategies. The purpose of this section is to review the main 
components of the ELI strategy and its critiques to the extent that is required to 
understand the ideological framework of the ELI strategy and to appreciate the 
perspective within which EPZ strategies that have been implemented by several 




As developing countries required more financing after the oil shocks in the 1970s, 
several loans had already been signed by the leaders of these countries with International 
Finance Institutions (IFIs). As interest rates began to rise, countries started to require 
even more financing to meet their debt serving needs. The IFIs at this juncture required a 
commitment to neo-liberal economic strategies that emphasized, among other things, the 
Export Led Industrialization (ELI) approach. It was argued by the IFIs that the failing 
economies of the developing countries were precisely due to the state interventions in the 
economy through strategies like ISI that had created distortions and inefficiencies in the 
economy. IFIs therefore set conditions on loans which required countries to shift from the 
ISI strategies to ELI strategies in order to receive financial support. 
This shift was a significant move that involved a complete ideological turnaround 
from a state-led strategy to a market-led strategy. As explained above the ISI approach 
allowed the state to develop key industries and nurture them to maturity. However, the 
neoliberal approach required the government to withdraw completely from direct 
economic activity and to allow the 'natural market forces' to operate. 
Renowned economist, Friedrich August von Hayek (1899-1992), was against any 
government intervention in economies, as he believed it would lead to totalitarianism. He 
also argued that in planned economies a group of individuals must allocate resources but 
these individuals will never have sufficient amount of information to carry out this allocation 
efficiently. He believed that the price mechanism in free markets was the most efficient in 
allocating resources, facilitating efficient exchange and use of resources (Yargin and 




can be traced back to Adam Smith's theories of neoliberal or 'free market' economics, which 
were fueled by the belief in the 'magic of the market' where ihe market is perceived as being 
the most efficient tool in regulating the economy (Simon, 2001; Gillis et al, 1992). 
These ideas were incorporated into mainstream policy discourse at the global level in 
the 1980s by two key political leaders, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Regan, who were 
strong supporters of Hayek and advocates of free markets. These leaders established policies 
that pushed forward privatization and deregulation, which resulted in a global recession that 
lasted three years. Consequently, these political leaders contended that such policies gave rise 
to short term pain but long term gain (Yargin and Stanislaw, 2002; Gillis et al, 1992; 
Cameron, 2004). 
Hayek's free market ideas are still very dominant today. This dominance is evident in 
neo-liberal economic and development policies. Neo-liberal development policies are 
presented as the only method for developing countries to achieve economic development. 
Developed countries continually preached to developing countries the need for free markets 
and government deregulation. Neoliberal policies were enforced on developing countries by 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) as conditions for access to funding and loans after 
the debt crisis in the 1980s. These conditions are referred to as structural adjustment policies 
(SAPs) (Chang and Grabel, 2004; Simon, 2001; Parpart and Veltmeyer, 2004). 
The SAPs included classic neo-liberal policy prescriptions mainly requiring the 
downsizing of the state and the deregulation of the market. Neo-liberal economics utilize 
Hayek's proposition that the market is the most efficient mechanism to effectively distribute 




efficiency globally, all countries must engage in open trade through reduced or eliminated 
tariffs, although this was only being systematically required from developing countries 
through the IFI conditionalities. Furthermore, it was preached that this was the only way to 
obtain long term sustainable economic growth. 
On the other hand, Francisco and Rodrik (2001) demonstrated that there is no 
negative correlation between trade barriers and economic growth. Similarly, Rodick (2007) 
further argued that open markets and free trade do not help an economy to industrialize 
unless the other economies in the free trade zone are at an approximately similar economic 
development stage - in line with the ISI approach. Thus free trading blocks within regions of 
similar development levels could be beneficial if all the countries were at similar economic 
levels, however a global free trade system would disadvantage the underdeveloped 
economies. 
In the 1990s, after a decade of implementing SAPs in developing countries, it became 
increasingly apparent that neoliberal policies had failed to promote development (economic 
or otherwise) and reduce poverty and inequality (Easterly, 2001). DFIs attributed this failure 
to weak political institutions who did not effectively implement liberalization policies and not 
to inadequacies of trade liberalization itself (Meyers, 1989). This argument was based on 
Anne Krueger's (1980) hypothesis that neoliberal economic policies would lead to a 
decreased amount of paperwork, delays, bureaucratic regulation and other process that cost 
both time and money. Thus, reducing the role of the state would reduce the bureaucracy and 




however did not happen, instead poverty and inequality in developing countries remained 
stagnant, and indeed increased in some (Easterly, 2001). 
As discussed above, EPZs are seen as the second best policy option, while the first 
would be to liberalize the market at a broad scale across the country, neo-liberals propose that 
EPZs can be stepping stones for countries to liberalize their markets. EPZs would provide the 
testing ground for liberalization allow the country to see the benefits of liberalization (this 
has been discussed in depth else where in this paper). 
The Developmental State 
One of the pivotal debates has been the role of the state in the development of 
industry. Neoliberal economics propose that the role of the state would be only to provide for 
macro-economic stability systems through the introduction of institutions like the central 
banks that can set exchange rates and control inflation, and taxation regulation authorities. 
The state would also be required to establish uncontrolled capital markets, and limit 
monopolies, and develop infrastructure to facilitate trade. The social services that the state 
should provide would be education and very basic health care so that a productive labour 
force exists. In sum, the state should create an environment that would attract foreign direct 
investment that would then fund some of the state's industrialization. Several multi-country 
studies published in the 1970s supported many of these hypotheses of neo-liberalism such as 
those carried out by Little et al (1970), Donges (1976) and Balassa (1978). 
There are some neo-liberal thinkers that propose that there needs to be some 




the redistributive market mechanisms to function appropriately. This would be the case when 
countries may want to develop a comparative advantage in a particular industry or when 
smaller firms are trying to develop in the presence of a large conglomerate. These 
monopolies restrict competition and therefore do not allow for the efficient distribution of 
resources to take place and therefore must be prevented by the state. 
Some neo-liberal thinkers, such as Dani Rodick (2007) do propose that the industrial 
sector needs to be rewarded through state subsidies to produce goods so that the technical 
abilities may develop in the country. Once these abilities have developed the sectors can then 
develop to higher value goods production. It is also proposed that to encourage and reward 
internationally competitive production, companies should be also be provided with export 
subsidies. Governments could also provide subsidized credit facilities to encourage 
investment. In some cases, governments have used state-owned manufacturing enterprises to 
promote production and export of high value goods. This perspective is then not ideologically 
far from some of the structuralists positions who promoted ISI with the exception that ISI 
was proposing protecting all sectors and developing a few for international production while 
the state supporting neo-liberals propose that all sectors should be free with the few that are 
being developed for export getting preferential treatment. 
Despite the hegemonic dominance of the market-led ELI strategy and its widespread 
implementation, little industrial development has resulted from it. Few countries have 
emerged as newly industrialized since the 1990s when widespread implementation of the 
neoliberal policies took place. Although these industrialized countries have been used as 




these policies to lead to significant industrialization. This then begs the question of whether 
market liberalization is indeed the best way to industrialize. One of the unresolved issues 
within the ELI debate is the role of the state, indeed within the proponents of the ELI 
approach, there are those who believe the state should have a more active role in the 
economy. It is clear that the ELI and the ISI approaches are on opposite ends of the spectrum, 
thus an approach that can be context specific may be the optimal solution. 
Hybrid Models of Industrialization 
Experiences from several countries have shown that successful economic policies 
are context specific. Many of the neoliberal prescriptions have been implemented, often 
through SAPs or reform programs, in a uniform way - i.e the same policies for every 
country. It is fair to say that in the majority of these countries there has not been any 
outstanding success and many would argue that in fact these policies have continuously 
failed to produce economic growth. This implies that there has to be a role for the state to 
play as the market forces do not lead to economic growth on their own. This is 
particularly true to developing countries which function in a constantly changing 
environment where several external factors over which they have no control effect their 
economies. 
The 'mixed' economy allows the government to control which sectors or 
industries will be protected and which will be allowed to trade on the global market, 
including when, how, where, and how much investment will take place. This essentially 
produces a hybrid or mixed economy that utilizes some components of the neoliberal __ 
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thinking of neoliberal economics allowing some sectors or industries to engage and 
integrate in the global economy. Simultaneously, it also allows the country to continue 
using some of the structuralist approaches that allow the government to address the 
structural challenges in its country and even to continue to use some of the import 
substitution measures to protect infant industries to allow them to strengthen. This gives 
the state the ability to adapt policies for specific outcomes, to overcome challenges, and 
even to get different outcomes. This is important because as Rodrik (2007) explains, 
policies required to ignite growth and to sustain growth are different. Thus, as countries 
become successful in igniting growth policies would need to be altered to ensure that 
growth is sustained. 
Policies required to ignite growth have been used by the now-developed countries 
during their periods of initial industrial development. These were very similar to the 
policies that neoliberal economics now condemns. Ha-Joon Chang (in Kremer et al, 
2009; Chang, 2002), has documented extensively the use of the so-called market 
interventionist policies in most European countries and North America. Britain, Beligum, 
United States, the Netherlands, Norway, Finland, and Austria all used tariffs and state 
subsidies to promote their own industries and protect their local markets from foreign 
goods. In addition, each of these countries provided significant access to cheap finance to 
their local industries. This was done through development banks, tax measures, and 
investment funds. 




South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, are so called because they have 
managed to sustain annual growth rates of approximately 10% per year for decades. They 
have been able to develop large industrial sectors, attract large amounts of foreign and 
local investment and export large quantities of their products. There have been several 
postulations of the contributors to the success of these miracle countries. 
The neoliberal school of thought proposes that the governments in the Asian Tiger 
countries got "the basics right" (1997:269). In this case, economists such as Chen, 
Bhagwati, and Wolf suggest that the states non-intervention in price formation, foreign 
trade and the functioning of private companies while providing a stable macro-economic, 
a reliable legal framework and appropriate polices for ELI growth have lead to this 
success. At the same time, economists such as Amsden and Wage from the revisionist 
Figure 1: East Asian Anomalies 
Institutional domain Mainstream ideal East Asian Tiger Pattern 
Property rights Private, enforced by the rule of law Private, but government authority 
occasionally overrides the law 
(esp. in Korea). 
Corporate governance Shareholder ("outsider") control, 




Arm's length, rule based Horizontal and vertical integration 
in production (chaebol); 
government-mandated "cartels" 
Financial system Deregulated, securities based, with 
free entry. 
Prudential supervision through 
regulatory oversight 
Bank based, restricted entry, 
heavily controlled by government, 
directed lending, weak formal 
regulation 
Labour markets Decentralized, deinstitutionalized, 
"flexible" labour markets. 




"Prudently" free Restricted (until the 1990s) 





school of thought suggest that the neoliberal analysis does not provide the deserved credit 
to the role of the state interventionist policies in promoting exports. This school of 
thought suggests that the previous ISI approach significantly strengthened industries so 
that there was a strong base on which to liberalize markets. However, during the 
transition phase many of these Asian Tiger countries used policy instruments such as 
direct subsidies of exports, tax breaks, duty drawbacks, import substitution on inputs, and 
tariff protection to promote local exports. In addition, the countries also used state 
resources to finance key sectors that were key for future areas of growth but where it was 
not profitable for the private sector to invest in. The significantly strong position taken by 
the revisionist perspective led the World Bank in 1993 to publish a report that accepted 
that selective interventions do contribute to growth but only if there are functioning 
markets, the 'right' policies, and the government ability to monitor appropriate economic 
performance criteria. In particular the World Bank report stated that government 
incentives for export promotion such as tax exemptions and export credit were 
particularly useful. These interventions have subsequently been a key part of Export 
Processing Zone strategies in developing countries. 
An analysis of their policies for industrialization shows that a very innovative 
approach was used. The neoliberal approach was not applied in a blanket manner but 
rather the government repeatedly tweaked its policies to address the challenges being 
faced by the industrial sector. The figure above shows some of the Asian Tiger anomalies 




Most of the Asian Tiger countries used similar strategies to develop their 
industrial sectors. Firstly, certain industries were considered key industries to develop as 
a base. These were chemicals, including industrial chemicals, petroleum refining, 
petroleum and coal products, plastic and plastic products and rubber and rubber products. 
Secondly, the machinery production was developed. This includes electrical and non 
electrical machinery, transport equipment and professional and scientific machinery. And 
finally, the development of basic metals such as iron and steel was developed. According 
to Chang (2009:3-4) the industrial policy measures of the East Asian countries included: 
(i) coordination of complementary investments (the so-called 
Big Push); 
(ii) coordination of competing investments through entry 
regulation, "investment cartels", and (in declining industries) 
negotiated capacity cuts; 
(iii) policies to ensure scale economies (e.g., licensing conditional 
upon production scale, emphasis on the infant industries 
starting to export from early on, state-mediated mergers and 
acquisitions); 
(iv) regulation on technology imports (e.g., screening for overly 
obsolete technologies, cap on technology licensing royalties); 
(v) regulation on foreign direct investment (e.g., entry and 
ownership restrictions, local contents requirement, 
technology transfer requirements, export requirements); 
(vi) mandatory worker training for firms above a certain size, in 
order to resolve the collective action problem in the supply of 
skilled workers due to the possibility of "poaching"; 
(vii) the state acting as a venture capitalist and incubating high­
tech firms; 
(viii) export promotion (e.g., export subsidies, export loan 
guarantees, marketing help from the state trading agency); 
(ix) government allocation of foreign exchanges, with top priority 
going to capital goods imports (especially for export 





It is clear from this list that this is not the neoliberal prescriptions nor the structuralist 
protection but rather a customized combination of the two that has been demonstrated to 
lead to sustained economic growth. These strategies are discussed in the relevant sections 
below with respect to export processing zones. 
It is therefore clear that there is no standard economic policy 'package' that will 
lead to industrial and economic growth. The International Finance Institutions (IFIs) such 
as the WB and the IMF have long stood by a predetermined package enshrined in the 
Washington Consensus. Many developing countries had resisted integration into the 
global economy and liberalizing their markets through the utilization of ISI strategies. 
Due to the economic crises of the 1970s most of these countries were forced to adopt the 
policy prescription of the IFIs. Through their success the Asian Tigers demonstrated that 
an alternative combination of policies is more likely to result in economic growth than 
the policy prescriptions of the IFIs. 
Most of the Asian countries who have been successful in developing their 
industrial sectors through the utilization of EPZs did not implement the neoliberal mode 
of EPZs. In contrast these countries went much further than what is explained above as 
the standard EPZ model. These countries utilized a ELI approach with a strong protection 
of the domestic industries with many similarities to the ISI approach. In the initial stages, 
ISI was the main orientation of the governments, with exports featuring mainly in 
agricultural products. But as the industries being developed through ISI became stronger 




competitive and export oriented. In Taiwan, for example, some industries were required 
to export 50% of their products in order to be allowed to sell in the local market 
(Amsden, 2001). Thus there was a marked shift in the perception of the role of export as 
commonly export was envisioned for surplus goods once the domestic market had been 
saturated, or for goods that could not be sold on the domestic market. However, this 
change prioritized production for export. Similarly in other countries, companies who 
agreed to export 100% of their products were given privileges such as access to working 
capital, tax breaks, and duty drawbacks. However, in order for there company to be 
continually eligible for these the export targets needed to be continually met. These 
incentives were only available for certain key sectors that were being promoted for 
export. This targeting allowed for specialization and technology development to take 
place in those sectors. 
In recognition that companies faced challenges in exporting their products, many 
of the Asian countries developed high level state bodies to promote export and to monitor 
export performance. These groups were often made up of a senior official such a the 
prime minister, ministers from key ministries concerned with export, representatives from 
key national financial institutions, and representatives from the private sector. The group 
met on a monthly or quarterly basis to discuss the performance of exporting first as well 
as to discuss challenges being faced by these firms in meeting their export targets 




Most countries had highly protected local markets and some even went as far as 
price control in the local market (India, Brazil). Goods that were already being produced 
locally was banned from being imported or had extremely high tariffs. When these import 
substitution industries became good enough, they were pushed into exporting their goods. 
Some countries also introduced bans on goods that were to be processed before export. In 
the case of Indonesia, the export of raw timber was banned and all wood products were 
required to be processed to the level of plywood before they could be exported. The state 
also protected smaller infant industries in certain sectors. Instead of allowing takeovers 
the state nurtured emerging industries. In many of these cases, especially if the industry 
was to produce for export in the future, the state provided subsidies and tax breaks to 
ensure the company can survive even though the economy of scale has not yet been 
reached. 
Governments also directed private sector investment and played a strong 
coordination role. The government ensured that investment within sectors was 
complimentary rather than competing. The government was intent on establishing 
economies of scale to make production more efficient and to make the price of 
production competitive on the global market. Thus investments in sectors were controlled 
and rather than competing industries being developed state mediated mergers were 
facilitated instead so that companies can grow (Amsden, 2001). 
The final role that the state played was that of an investor. With long term 




if the private sector was not investing in these sectors (Amsden, 2001). One of the sectors 
that the states invested in where the high-technology sectors that were the long term 
vision of the country but that were not yet profitable for private investors to engage in. 
Many of the additional interventions that were implemented by the Asian 
countries are currently being offered by many EPZ hosting companies as additional 
incentives to the EPZ package. The main difference between the Asian industrialization 
and EPZ strategies is that a significant number of the investors and the firms in the Asian 
countries were local companies. 
Conclusion 
EPZs have been used widely in the developing countries, being promoted by the 
neoliberal economists as a means of increasing foreign exchange earnings from increased 
exports, diversification of the domestic industry base and employment creation. 
However, few countries have seen positive outcomes manifesting as a result of EPZs. 
The success of the Asian countries has been consistently used as evidence that the EPZ 
model can produce these results. 
This literature review has examined EPZs in terms of their ability to increase 
foreign exchange revenue through export promotion, EPZs role in the diversification of 
the domestic industries and EPZs contribution to employment creation. A review was 
done of these proposed benefits of EPZs as well as what has manifested in various 




understanding how particular failures of realization of the benefits of EPZs have been 
mitigated by policies, especially where policies used have demonstrated a marked 
safeguarding against negative implications of EPZs. The purpose of this literature review 
was to offer an analytical framework to analyse the policies of Tanzania as it attempts to 
industrialize through the utilization of EPZs. 
This section has also briefly reviewed some key elements of different economic 
theories with respect to industrialization. The initially the ELI and the ISI approaches 
were reviewed with respect to industrialization to present their extreme positions. This 
was juxtaposed with the approach of the mixed economy where the state plays a 
significant interventionist role in developing the industrial sector directing investment 
and nurturing infant industries. Most developing countries have historically moved from 
ISI to ELI strategies mainly due to the external pressures resulting from financing 
constraints. However, the utilization of neoliberal economic policies has failed to 
promote significant industrialization in developing countries. In this regard, the 
developmental state and a hybrid approach to industrialization are presented which can 
take advantage of both an export orientation while allowing the state to regulate and 
intervene in the industrialization process. 
The literature review has compared the EPZ model proposed using the neoliberal 
economists of the IFIs with the so-called EPZ model that was utilized by the Asian 
countries, which was in reality an ELI approach with strong protection for the domestic 




The literature has illustrated that these two models have significant and fundamental 
differences. As most developing countries have implemented the EPZ model utilizing a 
neoliberal approach, there have been few resulting success stories. The neoliberal 
approach proposes that the benefits of EPZs will manifest through the 'magic-of-the-
market' and that if states want these benefits to be realized they must not distort the 
market with interventions. On the other hand, the experience of the Asian Tiger, Tiger 
Cubs and other countries has illustrated that benefits only manifest when states intervene 
with strong policies that target specific outcomes. 
Thesis Statement 
It has been shown through this literature review that the main reasons that 
countries introduce Export Processing Zones is to increase exports to benefit the balance 
of trade payments, diversify the domestic industry base, and to increase decent 
employment. The heavy focus on foreign direct investment as a key component of EPZ 
strategies implemented in most developing countries, such as Tanzania, is a major factor 
in the failure of EPZs reaching their development goals. The nature of FDI in a neoliberal 
context implies that foreign exchange earnings from exports do not remain in the 
economy where the EPZ is but rather are repatriated away; and that the 'race to the 
bottom' requires countries to provide incentive packages to attract FDI to the extent that 
there is no benefit to the host country. Similarly, the import intensive nature of EPZs 




for the EPZ manufacturer to import inputs from an international supplier and the 
incentives provided to EPZs make this importation cheaper than sourcing from the local 
market. Finally, the jobs provided by EPZs are poor in quality and provide little in terms 
of wages, and technological skills are not transferred to workers are most EPZ jobs are in 
low skill industries such as textiles production, therefore contributing little to the 
development of the country's population. 
The policy environment is crucial in ensuring that the benefits of the EPZs 
manifest. The role of the state has to be clearly defined as one that is able to guide, direct, 
and monitor the industrial sector, being able to attract FDI while protecting and 
developing the domestic industry. 
Methodoloev 
The Tanzanian EPZ programme is the subject of this study. The qualitative 
approach used allows for an in-depth study of the policies that govern EPZ programme of 
Tanzania. The historical context which has led to the introduction and implementation of 
an EPZ strategy, and the laws and policies that govern the EPZ programme in Tanzania 
will also be examined. Finally, empirical data will be collected to understand the 
influence of this EPZ programme on the economy of Tanzania to see if there are 
indications that this programme will be able to contribute to increasing the exports, 




data was collected mainly between January and October of 2011, although some 
information was collected as early as 2005. 
Data Identification 
Key events from Tanzania's history from independence to the implementation of 
the EPZ programme will be documented to understand the economic situation of 
Tanzania and the experiences of Tanzania with respect to industrialization. This will be 
done to understand to situation of Tanzania prior to the implementation of the EPZs 
programme and to understand the rational used in introducing such a programme. This 
will primarily involve a desk study which will review the literature and identify the key 
events and strategies in this period. 
To understand the approach being used by Tanzania in implementing the EPZs 
programme and the extent to which the neoliberal approach is being utilized, the laws and 
policies governing the EPZ programme will be analysed. These will be obtained from the 
official sources such as the Parliament of Tanzania's website where all enacted are 
archived. In addition, the relevant policies that govern the EPZs will be collected from 
online sources and from the respective ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs). 
These will be analysed from an understanding of the prescribed role of the state, the 
exemptions utilized to attract investors to EPZs and to understand the approach being 
utilized by the Government of Tanzania with EPZs to see if a ISI, ELI or hybrid model of 




Empirical data will be collected on the exports and imports in Tanzania and the 
balance of trade from the period just before the implementation (2000) of the EPZ 
programme until the end of 2010. This historical trend will be analysed to see if there has 
been any changes after the implementation of the EPZ programme and this will reveal the 
level of success of the EPZs in this regard. Data will be collected both from the Bank of 
Tanzania official export and import statistics as well as the Export Processing Zones 
Authority for triangulation purposes. Data on the FDI into Tanzania will also be collected 
from the same sources to understand the country's dependency on FDI over all and to 
understand its influence in the EPZ programme. 
The diversification of the domestic industry base would take several years to 
manifest in after the implementation of an EPZ programme. As the EPZ programme of 
Tanzania was only enacted in 2006, this study will look at the policy context to analyse if 
there are incentives for investors to diversify the domestic industry base. The laws and 
policies governing the EPZ programme will be analysed from this angle to understand if 
the model being utilized encourages domestic investment, and the diversification of 
domestic industry. 
Data on employment in Tanzania will be collected to understand the structure of 
the economy in this regard. Further to this data on employment within the EPZs will also 
be collected from the Export Processing Zones Authority (EPZA). Finally academic 
research done on EPZ employment in Tanzania was also collected to triangulate data 
from the EPZ authority and to inform on the nature of employment in EPZs in Tanzania. 




As all studies, this study too has its limitations. The availability of empirical data 
with regards to the EPZ programme has been the major limitation. The EPZA refused to 
provide data on specific operations of investors (both local and foreign) within the EPZs 
or disaggregated amounts of investment per investor. Similarly, the academic studies and 
secondary sources that discuss the performance of the Tanzanian EPZ programme are 
limited possibly because the programme is relatively young. Thus some information has 
been available on the employment standards in these EPZs but no information was 
available about the linkages being developed hence the linkages will only be discussed 





TANZANIA: Struggles to Industrialize 
As the first part of the case study this chapter will cover the almost thirty year 
period in the history of Tanzania from independence to the introduction of the EPZ 
policies. This is done with the intention of revealing and understanding the successes and 
challenges faced by Tanzania in this period. Several different attempts were made to 
industrialize and particularly to increase exports, diversify the domestic industry base and 
to increase decent employment. These attempts varied in their rate of success and this 
chapter will try to identify how or why these strategies succeeded or failed. The chapter 
shows that many of the policies and structures put into place did succeed initially and 
growth did take place in the introductory period. However, it illustrates that Tanzania's 
infant economy was hit hard by the global oil crises, whose effects were magnified by 
other regional shocks the country faced. These events eventually led to a total economic 
meltdown that forced the country borrow heavily from International Finance Institutions 
(IFIs) and to succumb to their loan requirements. 
Prior to Independence 
Prior to independence, the Tanzanian economy had largely been ignored by the 
global economic system thus was extremely weak and underdeveloped. It had only been 
maintained as the 'periphery to the periphery'. Nairobi in neighbouring Kenya had been 




Africa. Thus, Tanzania found itself ill prepared for the post-colonial development 
equipped only with a very low skills base, poor infrastructure, and untapped natural 
resource reserves. Being the largest country in the East African region Tanzania has an 
area of approximately 945,200 km2 (Bakobi, 1995:1) which is greater then the combined 
area of England, France and what was then known as East Germany. Each of whom were 
then already major economies on the global scale (Bienefeld, 1982:293) and major 
donors to Tanzania in the early independence period. In comparison, Tanzania's 
economic output was less than 0.5% of the total output of these three countries and had 
less that 10% of the combined populations (Bienefeld, 1982:293). Tanzania small 
population was dispersed throughout the large land area much of which had vast areas 
that were either dry, Tse-tse fly infested, or both. Large portions of the population 
suffered from Malaria and Bilharzia (Bienefeld, 1982:293). Tanzania's main assets at 
independence included the lingua-franca Kiswahili language that united most of the 
national groups within the geographical boundaries of the young state and the almost 
universal popularity of the revolutionary party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) that came 
into power at independence. At this point Tanzania's main exports were coffee, cotton, 
sisal and tea implying that the economy was almost entirely reliant on agricultural 




Early Independence: Defining the Role of the State 
During the period from independence in 1961 to the first oil crisis of 1973, 
Tanzania's economy grew significantly, especially when its pre-independence position is 
taken into account. The period also saw the rise and implementation of African Socialism 
' UjamacC under the leadership of President Nyerere which included strong state control 
and direction of all means of production in the country. Although the state policies were 
initially influenced by capital, the state made deliberate moves to direct investment and 
maintain its autonomy. During this period the state established the National Development 
Corporation (NDC) to guide investment as well as the Tanzania Industrial Studies and 
Development Centre (TISDC) to conduct market research and other studies to enhance 
industrialization. The period saw an overall growth in human development indicators like 
life expectance and literacy. Despite its challenges the period also saw a growth in the 
industrial sector as well as in its export earnings. 
At independence as the national government was formulating its development 
strategies there was the immense example of the success of the industrialized countries 
that had achieved their development goals and had developed strong economies. A World 
Bank delegation that visited the country in 1959 published a report in 1961 outlining 
recommendations for the country's initial program for economic development. This 
report reinforced many of the colonial economic relationships and dependencies. 
Although Tanzania did not officially become a member of the World Bank Group until 




was based heavily on the 1961 World Bank recommendations. The promise of full 
employment, low inflation and improved health care and education services led Tanzania 
to implement free market capitalist policies as per the World Bank recommendations. 
Shortly after independence the Tanzanian government commissioned another group of 
economists to develop the next 5-year plan to implemented from 1964/5 - 1969/70. 
However, this plan emerged with few differences to the first 3-year plan (Mittelman, 
1980:144). Hence, Tanzania proceeded with a liassez-faire economic approach. 
During the first 2 years of independence, over 90% of the national budget was 
provided by the British Government. The level and share from the British government 
declined after these first two years with the introduction of the USA and the Federal 
Republic of Germany as donors to the government. Sixty-eight percent of the funding for 
the first 3-year plan came from the British Government with the US and West Germany 
providing 11% and 9% respectively. Thus 88% of the government budget was provided 
by donors. Financing for the next plan covering 1964/5-1969/70 was also expected to be 
donor led, with expectations of UK, USA, West Germany and the World Bank to be 
prospective donors. However, relations between Tanzania and the US, as well as the UK 
soured for various international reasons between 1964 and 1965 which resulted in the UK 
freezing £7.5 million loan in 1965, no funding from the US and a severing of diplomatic 
relations by West Germany (Ndulu, 1986). As a result of these events, Tanzania found 
itself faced with challenges to finance its five-year plan. As a result of approaching other 




accepted to undertake a large portfolio of investments in Tanzania including the 
establishment of a large state farm, construction of a dam and provision of village water 
supply in southern Tanzania among others (Ndulu, 1986). The financial situation was 
controlled at the time, but Tanzania remained heavily dependent on external financing. 
Exports and Foreien Direct Investment 
Both the 3-year plan and the 5-year plan focused Tanzania's energies on 
developing its cash crop production for export with little emphasis on food crop 
production to meet domestic needs. Similarly, there was little emphasis on developing 
Tanzania's industries or any of the local markets. The only reference in the 5-year plan 
was to increase the share of manufacturing production from 4% to 7.5% (Skarstein et al, 
1986). As the government of Tanzania during this period had emerged directly out of the 
struggles for independence its priorities remained very much in bettering the conditions 
under which 'the people' lived and reducing its dependence on the colonial powers. 
Since, the free market policies at this point promised full employment and a general 
increase in the quality of life for the people, therefore seemed like a viable and promising 
strategy to pursue. 
The 3-year and 5-year plans proposed that industrial development would be 
highly dependant on foreign direct investment. The Foreign Investments Protection Act 
of 1963 allowed foreign investors to repatriate capital, guaranteed land provisions for 




investors could get tariff protection in the local market by bargaining with the 
government (Minister of Industries) which in some cases this was almost over 500% of 
the real price and the government often granted monopolies or close to monopolies. It 
was believed that without this incentive investors would not invest (Rwenymamu, 1976). 
With the national budget being heavily donor funded and the majority of investors 
being foreigners there was immense pressure on the government to establish policies that 
were favourable to the donors and foreigners. This can be seen in the various policies 
being implemented, including for example, the protection of the domestic market for 
foreign manufacturing firms. Thus there was also an increase in the influence of the 
foreigners in the local legislation and foreigners were getting the same or better 
privileges as locals (Szentes, 1973:66). 
As explained in chapter 1, many developing countries at this time were struggling 
with developing their own domestic industry base. However, their infant economies were 
highly dependant on donor funding and imports. The requirements imposed by these 
foreign economies implied that foreign industry was incentivized and protected while 
domestic industry was being disincentivized and discouraged. The Tanzanian 
government, in an effort to maintain its political and economic sovereignty, strongly 
resisted any interference with its policies from either private capital or EFIs. In 1965, 
President Nyerere established the one party state in an effort to curb the influence of 
corporate sponsorship of political parties through which laws and policies could be 




The high labour standards established by the revolutionist government, low 
developed skills base, poor infrastructure and scarce natural resources, coupled with the 
resistance of the government to create an environment that would attract the investment 
of private capital resulted in a net outflow of capital rather than an increase in the foreign 
investment required for growth under the free market model. 
The IFIs and Western countries continued to promote the free market model, there 
was little financial support from them to fund Tanzania's emerging revolutionist 
philosophies and people centred development strategies. Given this dynamic there was 
little incentive for the government to continue pursuing development using the free 
market model which challenged the sovereignty of the state as well as undermined the 
social conditions under which the populist government wanted to pursue development. 
As a final and absolute measure to limit the control and influence of capital on Tanzania, 
the state implemented a self-reliance strategy based on the socialist priorities of the 
government through the Arusha Declaration of 1967. 
Nyerere's African Socialism called 'Ujamaa', in Swahili meaning 'family hood', 
was based on the notion that all citizens of Tanzania were a large extended family 
(Nyerere, 1962). Through this, Nyerere took the deep rooted pre-colonial African 
traditional cultural values that accentuated the importance of families and extended this 
notion to the entire nation by incorporating it within the state apparatus and therefore 
crystallizing it into the society (Maluki, 1965). The main tenet of this form of socialism 




personal level. The aim was the establishment of a society that was based on a "social 
need for human dignity and equality" (Nyerere, 1966 in Pratt, 1976) and in this society 
every group would be treated equally (Pratt, 2000). 
While economic development was indeed a priority within these policies, the 
emphasis was placed on the personal, social and psycho-spiritual growth of the citizens 
and the development of a moral responsibility of the individual towards other human 
beings (Magesa, 1999). The Ujamaa strategy intended to decrease income inequalities 
and increase the direct participation of individuals in the decision making process of the 
government. The establishment of village and workers councils as well as rural village 
party branches enhanced the democratic decision making process through the increased 
communication channels between urban political centres and the population, the majority 
of whom lived in remote rural villages . 
In the years that the Ujamaa strategy was able to function as planned there was 
significant improvement in the economy. Between 1967 and 1973 large amounts of 
foreign investment was attracted, on terms favourable to the government, including a 
US$400 million interest free loan from China, previously rejected by the World Bank and 
the Soviet Union, for the development of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (Mittelman, 
1980:144). The economy performed well, and the political environment was stable 
especially if both are compared to other sub-Saharan Africa countries. The savings ratio 
in Tanzania rose and income distribution mechanisms were implemented effectively. The 




kept up with population growth (Rwegasira, 1987:1322). Similarly, in the human 
development of the people of Tanzania. Literacy increased from 15% at independence to 
70% by 1977 and access to clean water increased from 5% to 45% in the same period 
(Havnevik, 1993:54). 
While growth of cash crop production was slow, there was a steady increase in 
the food crop production for domestic use (Mittelman, 1980:152). Between 1970 and 
1973 Tanzania was able to be almost completely self-sufficient in food production and 
food imports being almost negligible in this period (Bienefeld, 1982:303). In addition, 
growth was accompanied with little inflation and a comfortable balance of payments was 
established (Rwegasira, 1987:1322). 
The Arusha Declaration (1967) identified the major means of production as land, 
forests, minerals, water, oil and electricity, news media, communications, banking and 
insurance, export-import trade, wholesale trade and major industries. Within industries 
the major means of production were identified as iron and steel, machine-tool, 
automobile, cement, fertilizer, and textile. Within production in general, large plantations 
especially those that would be able to provide raw materials for important industries were 
also categorized as major means of production. This was all inline with the principle of 
self-reliance of reducing imports and utilizing local resources as the means for 
development. 
However, the Arusha declaration did not fully clarify the priorities within the 




and a strong Import Substitution Industrialization (IS I) approach was undertaken. The 
second 5-year plan (1969 - 74) had made direct links between industrial development 
and rural development and created space for the establishment of small scale industries. It 
prioritized the decentralization of industry to nine towns identified for growth (Dar Es 
Salaam not being one of them), through the establishment of labour intensive 
technologies so as to utilize available human and natural resources in an equitable way 
(Skarstein et al, 1986). 
The improvements in the human development experienced in this period are 
indicative of the potential of the Ujamaa strategy in bettering the conditions of its people. 
While there were some flaws in the policies and how some of them were implemented. 
The biggest challenge being faced by the Tanzanian state at this point was achieving their 
balance of payments. Tanzania had to borrow from the EFI's and bilateral donors and by 
the end of 1973 had already accrued a debt of over US$1.1 billion (Easterly, 2001). 
There were some challenges that were also developing in the development 
strategy. The growth of export crops had been exceptionally slow, coupled with the 
declining terms of trade and the economy's dependence on agricultural products, there 
was consistently a scarcity of foreign exchange required of essential inputs for industrial 
production. The declining terms of trade implied that more export crop needed to be 
produced to purchase the same amount of industrial input. Thus Tanzania began to find 




Figure 2: Export Profile of Tanzania in the 1960s. 
Industry Unit 1963 1967 increase 
Textiles '000s of yards 6,225 18,277 293% 
Beer '000s of gallons 1,962 5,120 261% 
Cigarettes Millions 1,144 2,044 179% 
Paints Gallons 95,357 274,623 288% 
Plywood '000 square feet 2,004 8,808 440% 
Wheat Flour Tons 28,378 41,159 145% 
Pyrethrum extract Tons 99 287 290% 
Source: Rweyemamu, (1976). 
acquire input for industry was beginning to hinder self-reliance strategy Tanzania was 
attempting to pursue. 
The year 1964 marked the beginning of a period of greater expansion, with 
manufacturing value added growing over 10 per cent per year between 1964 and 1972 
and the share of industry growing from 7.1% per cent to 11 % per cent of GDP (Wangwe 
in Szirmai et al, 2001). Despite the challenges, the five-year plan (1964/5-1969/70) had 
placed major emphasis on expanding the manufacturing activity for the East African 
internal market. By 1970, this activity was expected to be twice as large as the primary 
processing activity in the industrial sector. The plan focused heavily on attracting foreign 
direct investment however it did not discourage local investment in manufacturing. 
Tanzania saw increased industrial growth and production in several key sector increased 
dramatically. 
Diversification of Domestic Industry 
Tanzania was not developed by the colonial administration to be a manufacturing 




the industrial base. The domestic market was fairly small and therefore couldn't provide 
enough stimuli to local manufacturing firms that were trying to get established but that 
were not competitive enough to produce for export. Secondly, Tanzania's labour force 
was small, unskilled and expensive. Finally, Tanzania lacked the inputs such as iron, 
coal, and electricity required for industrialization. 
In the 1960s, activity in the manufacturing sector included mainly basic 
processing of agricultural commodities for export markets and the manufacture of 
import-competing goods for sale in the domestic market. Due to the small domestic 
market, the development growth of the import-substitution industries was very slow. The 
agricultural production was the basis for the success of both these activities. If the 
agricultural production drops there would be a decrease in the raw produce that needs to 
be processed for export. Similarly, the low agricultural products would also decrease the 
income of individuals in the local market who are dependant on the agricultural sector for 
their livelihood. Thus for the industrial sector to be sustained, there was an inherent need 
for the agricultural sector to be productive. 
Tanzania lacked basic mineral resources like coal and iron for inputs into 
industrial sectors. There were significant coal reserves in the southern highlands but the 
country had poor infrastructure. Thus, it was impossible to transport heavy machinery to 
these areas for extraction and similarly, it was impossible to take extracted material to 
processing centres, markets or ports. These minerals therefore remained untapped and 




Electricity production was very low in the period leading up to independence. 
However, 1962 the total output increased by almost 400% due to the increased usage of 
diesel powered generators. In 1962 diesel electricity output was almost 50% greater than 
the traditional hydropower generation. During this period hydropower generation did not 
have any significant increase (Tanganyika Statistical Abstract, 1962-1963 in Rutman, 
1968) even though there were several locations where hydropower dams would have 
been very effective. This implied that by 1962,60% of the electricity was being produced 
by diesel generators that were completely dependant on imported fuel. Most of this 
electricity was provided to the economic centers of the country in the Eastern and 
Northern parts. The government perceived the greatest limitation for the investment in 
the energy sector (renewable or not) was the lack of a developed industrial sector to 
demand large sources of energy. As there was no demand, the government decided not to 
invest in energy production. Similarly, as the availability of power does not guarantee a 
demand or a spurt in economic activity there were no plans in the early 1960s to electrify 
the whole country. Rather the priority was to supply the major towns and cities which 
were the economic centers. 
The common East African market posed a particular challenge for Tanzania in 
attracting the FDI required in the 3-year and 5-year plans. Kenya, which had been the 
capital of British East Africa prior to independence, offered a much more attractive 
investment climate for foreign capital. In particular, Nairobi offered the best water supply 




link by rail to the largest sea port of East Africa - Mombasa, and the largest pool of 
skilled labour in East Africa. Kenya's comparative advantage in this respect posed a great 
threat to Uganda and Tanzania and was a point of great contention between leaders. The 
common market allowed for the free movement of goods and all factors of production, 
thus Tanzania's domestic market (regardless of how small) would be accessible to all the 
countries in the Union. This meant that local industries that Tanzania was trying to 
develop would have to contend with foreign industries that may have been established in 
Nairobi. The Union implied that Tanzania could not protect its market in order to develop 
its own industries. In an effort to maintain the union as well as to allow the weaker 
economies to develop, each country was allowed to have a monopoly in developing 
certain products. Although, Kenya did not ratify the Kampala Agreement of 1964 
immediately, Tanzania was allowed exclusively production of aluminium sheets, tyres 
and tubes and radio assembly (Rweyemamu, 1973). 
Government structures to promote industry 
During this period the government established several organizations to develop 
the industrial sector: the National Development Corporation and the Tanzania Industrial 




National Development Corporation 
In 1964, the government established through an act of Parliament, the National 
Development Corporation (NDC) which was controlled and financed entirely by the 
government. The primary objectives of the NDC were to promote foreign direct 
investment to establish large scale manufacturing and to create and run government 
enterprises generally in areas of manufacturing such as primary commodity processing 
and import competing industries. The focus was to invest in industries that would be 
catalysts in developing the economy as well as the skills base in the labour market. The 
NDC was led by a board consisting of 10 members including the ministers responsible 
for finance, industries, commerce, agriculture and tourism and 5 other persons appointed 
by the President, one of whom being the Chair (GoT, No. 69 Tanganyika Development 
Corporation (Amendment), 1964). While the NDC was a government entity it functioned 
outside of the ministries and reported directly to parliament. The NDC was furnished 
with a Reserve Fund aimed at funding investment in corporations. The government 
nationalized several private industries in this period and the NDC was given control over 
these. These included: Nyanza Salt Mines Ltd., Tanganyika Packers Ltd., Williamson 
Diamonds Ltd., Kahama Nzega Igembesabo Co-operative Union Ltd., Lake Manyara 
Hotels Ltd., Ralli Estates Ltd., Sikh Saw Mills (T) Ltd., Tanganyika Development 
Finance Co. Ltd., Tanganyika Meerschaum Corporation Ltd., Tanganyika and Italian 
Petroleum Refinery Company (Tiper) Ltd., Tanita Co. Ltd., and Uplands Bacon Factory 




the lack of experience in managing large scale industries. The government was acquiring 
a large number of industries through nationalization and the NDC faced many challenges 
in efficiency and effectiveness in management while trying to keep up with the high 
acquisition rate. 
Tanzania Industrial Studies and Development Centre 
To further promote investment in the manufacturing sector, the government 
established the Tanzania Industrial Studies and Development Centre (TISDC). The 
ministry of Industry and Commerce in its efforts to encourage investment in industry 
provided services to carry out market research for new products, technical possibilities 
for producing these products and information on availability of labour with the 
appropriate skills, viability of the market, probably of obtaining import tax rebates and 
the availability of raw material suppliers and outlets for retail sales. However, the 
research was demand driven and as such investors had to request the ministry to conduct 
the relevant research. 
The center was mandated to enhance new industry formation and the marketing of 
Tanzania's products to external markets. In order to encourage new industry the 
following incentives were provided: tax reductions, market and industrial research. In 
addition to tax reductions, the investors were entitled to claim back 20% depreciation in 
their first year and 15% per year for the next 6 years, import duty waivers and refunds on 




benefit were that raw materials must not be available on the domestic market thus 
fostering backward linkages. The second condition was that the benefits to the country 
must exceed the revenue lost from the tax exemption either through gains in income tax 
receipts, increased employment or stimulation of further manufacturing activity i.e. 
forward linkages. This policy is very interesting as it deliberately set conditions that 
promoted or even required linkages and rewarded linkages when they happened. These 
conditions have since been lost in the policies in Tanzania as well as in the global 
economy dialogue with the increased emphasis on liberalization. 
In these early years there was recognition that foreign exchange earning was 
important; however there was a stronger emphasis on self-reliance and import 
substitution. Thus at this point there weren't deliberate attempts of earn foreign 
exchange; rather the emphasis was on developing industry. 
The TISDC provided small loans to native Africans to establish small scale 
manufacturing firms. Most of the available local capital was controlled by Asian traders, 
many of whom had been naturalized to become Tanzanian citizens after independence 
but were yet to be perceived as 'Tanzanian" or local capital. 
Both the NDC and the TISDC were efforts by the government to direct 
investment so that exports can be increase and the local manufacturing base is diversified 
despite all the challenges to industrialization being faced by the government. In each of 
these organizations foreign investment was sought but there were systematic mechanisms 




their performance to its board and to the Parliament ensuring that there was industrial 
growth and that the earnings were channelled back to the state. The TISDC applied some 
of the neoliberal principles of tax reductions, and other financial incentives to both local 
and foreign investors. At this point Tanzania was utilizing the principle of reciprocity in 
its incentives where duty waivers and refunds were contingent on local unavailability of 
raw materials imported as well as the net gains for the country being positive even after 
duty waivers and refunds are applied. Despite providing some good results in this initial 
post-independence period these policies were eliminated in later years. These policies 
were similar to the policies utilized by many Asian Tiger countries in their 
industrialization strategies as discussed in chapter 1. Tanzania saw significant growth 
during this period and both human developments as well as economic growth targets 
were being met. 
Basic Industry Strategy 1975-1995 
After the first oil shock the government developed the Basic Industry Strategy 
focused on developing industry nationally. In addition to this the government established 
several research organizations to deepen the knowledge of industry. However, the 
multiple organizations established created confusions and drew heavily of already scare 
resources. 
During this period, with the increased focus and discussions at regional and 




was intended to cover two decades spanning from 1975-1995. The strategy was very 
much in line with the principles of self reliance and aimed to ensure that domestic needs 
for industrial goods would be met primarily by domestic production (Wangwe in Srizmai 
et al., 2001). There were two sets of emphases placed; the first was on the production of 
basic needs of the people which included components including food processing, textiles, 
clothing, footwear, building materials, and materials and facilities to meet the 
requirements of education, health services, transportation and water supply. The second, 
consisted of activities which utilize domestic resources to produce and supply inputs for 
the first set (BIS, 1975). The strategy was designed to have state-led development with a 
high level of state control over means of production. Although the strategy aimed to 
minimize the reliance on foreign direct investment, it was ultimately funded by bilateral 
international aid. 
Centres of Knowledge and Excellence 
In 1976, the Tanzania Industrial Studies and Consultancy Organization (TISCO) 
was established with the primary intention of developing a center of excellence in 
Industrial Studies. The organization provided consultancy and advisory services in 
subjects associated with industrial development, and fostering, encouraging and 
monitoring the expansion and use of modern industrial techniques and practices, and 
conducting research to determine which would be the most beneficial industries for the 




feasibility studies to promote the usage of modern technology (URT, 1976). Reporting to 
the Minister of Industries, this organization was recognition on the side of the 
government that industrialization required the use of technology and a culture within the 
industry to develop and evolve the modes of production to more efficient modes. This 
organization was led by a board of directors that was appointed by the Minister of 
Industries, however, the qualifications of the board members was never outlined. 
In 1979, the Tanzania Industrial Research and Development Organization 
(TIRDO) was set up and in 1980 the Tanzania Engineering and Manufacturing Design 
Organization (TEMDO). There was little difference in the structure and mandate of 
TIRDO and TISCO. Both TIRDO and TEMDO were developed to design and promote 
the use to technology in economic activities with a focus on utilizing raw materials. Both 
organizations were mandated to experiment and adapt international technologies to be 
application to the local operating context and using locally available materials. It is 
possible, given the timing of the establishment of TIRDO and TEMDO that there were 
final attempts by the government to develop industry in the face of an economic collapse. 
These organizations are still operational in 2011 although the extent of their impact has 
been rather limited. 
Decent Employment Creation 
The agriculture sector, which employed the highest number of people, suffered 




it. In 1964,43.7% of the employed workforce was either in agriculture, forestry or 
fishing. This was followed by public service, which employed 29.6% of the labour force, 
while manufacturing employed only 6.4% of the labour force (Budget Survey, 1965-66 in 
Rutman 1968). 
Tanzania still had a low amount of 'productive' labour as the majority of people 
worked in the subsistence sector. Formally employed labour force was low making the 
domestic market for industrialized goods was too small for profitable private sector 
investment. The manufacturing sector employed approximately 80,000 people in 1961, 
45,000 of whom were engaged in primary processing which amounted in 52% of the 
wage bill of the sector. 
The labour force was generally unskilled, undisciplined and had low productivity 
levels. Agriculture, which was the largest employing sector, was the lowest paying sector. 
The East African Royal Commission claimed that the productivity increases that would 
result if the workforce moved to sectors such as manufacturing. It was stated that the 
work forced faced two obstacles: (1) lack of skills and (2) lack of factory discipline. At 
this point only about 100,000 labourers in Tanganyika could be classified as skilled these 
included bricklayers, carpenters, clerks etc (Rutman, 1968). 
There were also high rates of internal migration within the country. With the high 
levels of dependence on and low levels of productivity in agriculture, many men from 
rural areas migrated to find work in urban areas and plantation estates between harvests. 




need workers all year around, those employees who go away during harvest time loose 
their jobs. The rural men therefore had little motivation to learn new skills and routines 
required for non-agricultural employment as it was perceived as temporary. In order to 
reduce the internal migration, the government introduced monthly wages and abolished 
the daily waged system. However, the government established the highest minimum 
wage in sub-Saharan Africa and established high labour employment standards despite 
having a low-skilled and poorly educated population. The immediate result of this was 
unemployment, as employers' reduced redundant staff that was intended to compensate 
for low productivity. However, in the longer term the net effect was to stabilize waged 
employment. 
During this period the government invested heavily in education programmes. 
Primary education was made compulsory and secondary and tertiary education systems 
were developed. This resulted in increased literacy and by 1970,70% of Tanzanians 
could read and write Kiswahili (Havnevik, 1993). In addition, the government established 
vocational training and adult literacy programmes (Havnevik, 1993). However, the low 
skills base was not available during the early independence period when the government 
was struggling to develop the domestic industry base. 
Shocks to the Economy 
Unlike the period between 1960 and 1972 when the growth rate of the industrial 




starting from 1973 the industrial growth rate was generally lower that the overall 
economic growth (Skarstein et al, 1986). The oil shocks of 1973 accelerated global 
inflation and caused a rise in the cost of industrial imported inputs as well as caused a 
decline in the global prices of agricultural products. For Tanzania this had devastating 
effects. As Tanzania tried to overcome the first oil shock, it was faced with droughts, 
floods and wars before the second oil shock. This presented great challenges to the 
economy and resulted in the reversing of many of the accomplishments of the previous 
period and ultimately led to a broad scale economic crisis. 
Prior to 1973 the economies of the North were prosperous and the high levels of 
profit earnings were made available for investment in developing countries as loans to 
governments at very low interest rates. However, with the oil crisis impacting the entire 
global economy, there was a sharp increase in the interest rates of previous loans as well 
as subsequent loans. The sharp increases in the interest rates of the loans implied that the 
government was spending more of its annual revenue servicing debts rather then 
investing in the development priorities or purchasing required inputs for manufacturing. 
Due to the revenue challenges of Tanzania, the government found it had to borrow more 
even at the high rates just to be able to meet prior debt obligations (Mittelman, 
1980:162). 
The oil shock of 1973 led to an increase of 200% on global oil prices (Rwegasira, 
1987:1323). Tanzania imported 100% of its energy at this point and thus was utilizing 




and other public uses (Rwegasira, 1987:1323). The initial impact of this shock and the 
resulting balance of payments deficit was absorbed by the government reserves 
accumulated over the pervious years of agricultural self-sufficiency. However the 
following shocks could not be dealt with in this way. 
The oil crises lead to a further worsening of the terms of trade for Tanzania. With 
38% of the gross domestic product (GDP) of Tanzania being made up of agricultural 
exports, the decline in the selling price of agricultural products implied a decreased 
income level for the country. This in turn led to a severe shortage in revenue thus leading 
to a balance of payments crisis (Rwegasira, 1987:1321). The balance of payments was 
further distorted by the increase in the cost of borrowing from EFIs. 
The droughts in 1974 and 1975 led to extensive crop failure throughout the 
country. The food crop self-sufficiency could not be met and export crops were 
inadequate in earning the required foreign exchange. In order to avoid widespread 
starvation the government had to resort to importing food for national consumption 
costing 36% of the export earnings of this period (Rwegasira, 1987:1323). This in turn 
had detrimental effects on the already strained balance of payments. The general 
availability of foreign exchange to import necessary inputs for industrial production was 
much harder to secure. The government attempted to deal with this situation through a 
decreased expenditure on infrastructure developments, capital spending, and 
technological investments. In addition, maintenance and replacement of technologies was 




general (Bienefeld, 1982:306). The next few years saw little manufacturing taking place 
primarily due to the decline in investment. The country did request international 
assistance in dealing with the difficult economic situation however; the assistance 
provided by the international community was far from adequate to meet the needs of 
Tanzania (Rwegasira, 1987:1331). 
The years of 1976 saw a growth in the economy mainly due to an increase in 
subsistence farming and the service sector. Due to the increase in subsistent farming there 
was a sharp decline in export crop production. As agricultural products were the major 
earners of foreign-exchange mechanism of the country at this stage, the lack of 
production in this sector resulted in the constraints of foreign exchange to continue as 
well as the challenge of meeting the balance of payments. 
This scarcity in income implied that the Tanzanian government had little available 
capital to invest in the industrial sector that has been neglected during the oil crisis 
period. Overall during this period Tanzania saw a general decrease in export earnings and 
a 10% decrease in manufacturing (Bienefeld, 1982:306). This situation lead to a general 
shortage of good within the country and resulted in government imposed restrictions on 
consumption of various products including oil based fuel consumption. The shortages and 
restrictions resulted in a raise in the level of corruption within the state bureaucracy, 
demoralization and an increase in taxation. This led to a feeling of discontent arising in 




As the weather returned to normal in 1976, between 1976 and 1977 there was a 
20% increase in food-crop production restoring general food security (Rwegasira, 
1987:1322) as well as a 20% increase in cash-crop production (Bienefeld, 1982:307). An 
increased production of tea and coffee allowed Tanzania to benefit from the temporary 
boom in the price of these products on the global market due to frost in Brazil (Wobst, 
2001:10). Thus there was decreased pressure on the balance of payments and foreign 
exchange crises. The increase in agricultural production resulted in the real GDP 
increasing by 13.3% (Bienefeld, 1982:307) and industrial growth reach over 17% for the 
first time since 1973. In 1977-78 manufacturing value added increased by 14% (Skarstein 
et al, 1986). Despite some persistent deficits in trade and balance of payments the 
government reserves and domestic savings that had been depleted in pervious years were 
restored. Thus this period provided some relief to the financial crises taking place in 
Tanzania. 
The 1977 dissolution of the East African Community (EAC) had major 
implications for the Tanzanian economy. The EAC had been pivotal in establishing a 
common market for goods produced within the region. Additionally, the EAC had 
allowed for the joint financing of several infrastructure facilities such as the East African 
Railways Corporation (EARC), the East African Harbours Corporation (EAHC), the East 
African Ports and Telecommunications Corporation (EAP&TC) and the East African 
Airways Corporation (EAAC) (Eken, 1979:37). In addition, there was the establishment 




focus of funding development activities especially in Tanzania and Uganda, but also in 
Kenya. These corporations allowed all three countries within the community to fund in an 
effort to increase domestic merchandise development and regional trade. However, 
primarily due to the differences in political ideologies, relations within the community 
had been under great strain (Eken, 1979:38). In 1977, Tanzania closed its boarders to 
Kenya thus severely obstructed the opportunities of trade between the two countries. 
Relations between Tanzania and Uganda had already been strained since 1971 when Idi 
Amin took over the Ugandan presidency through a military coup. Thus the closing of the 
Tanzania-Kenya boarder in effect signified the final act in dissolving the EAC and 
crystallized the already developing fractures within the region. 
While it is true as many argue that the dissolution of the EAC had severe negative 
repercussions for trade within the region, the high similarities between the economies of 
these countries implied that a large majority their products were similar (Eken, 1979:38). 
Thus, there was little trade between the countries but rather all of these countries 
competed for markets in industrialized countries as both the consumers of East African 
export-crops and the suppliers of East African industrial inputs. The main role of the 
EAC had been to provide financial support to the economically weaker countries in the 
region as well as a cost-sharing system for infrastructure services that all three countries 
used for trade. Thus, it was this withdrawal of support mechanisms that impacted 




harbours, and railways further challenged Tanzania in the ability to import and export. 
The balance of payments began to deteriorate on what seems to be a downhill journey. 
The dissolution of the EAC also implied a decreased stability in the region in 
general due to the decreased cooperation between countries, thus in 1978, shortly after 
the collapse of the regional organization, war broke out between Tanzania and Uganda. 
The details regarding the cause of the war are beyond the scope of this paper. But 
Tanzania could not afford a war at this time and neither was it equipped for it. The war 
with Uganda lasted over a year and cost approximately US $500 million. Agricultural 
production increased by 4.6% during 1978 however, export crop production decreased 
despite good weather. Coupled with the end of the coffee boom on the world market the 
decreased export crop production resulted in a 19% decline in export earnings (Balassa, 
1990:387). Even though during this period there was a surplus of food crop produced, 
Tanzania was unable to store this crop due to the lack of facilities and the inability to 
invest in their creation. Thus food crop was sold for cheap and export crop earnings were 
used as partial financing for the war. However, the increased costs of the war resulted 
implied an increased amount of imports thus export earnings in 1978 financed only 41% 
of imports (Bienefeld, 1982:309). 
The major impact on the manufacturing sector of the dissolution of the EAC was 
the loss of the regional markets from Tanzania. Up until 1977, Tanzania's major 




and batteries. The main markets for most of these produces were exported to the EAC 
and access to these was lost with the dissolution of the EAC (Wangwe, 1995). 
The resulting financial crisis was magnified by the second oil shock of 1979 as 
well as crop failure in 1979 due to floods. Thus Tanzania found itself having to import 
food grains that it could not store the previous year as well as importing energy at high 
costs. Unable to meet this financial obligations Tanzania made several appeals for 
international assistance on both fronts. However, potentially due to the global recession 
caused by the oil shock, the assistance provided by the international community was far 
from adequate. The food shortage continued due to droughts in subsequent years and 
Tanzania imported food until 1981. 
Despite the shocks to the economy, during this period the government continued 
to invest in developing industry. The major source of this revenue was international aid 
flows, thus although the government had made a deliberate move to reduce dependence 
on foreign investors, this had merely translated into an increased dependence on foreign 
aid. The 1970's saw an overall increase of 35% in the industrial sector although the 
growth in production was much slower (Wangwe, 1983). During this period there was a 
deliberate effort to emphasize industry over agriculture. Agriculture was the dominant 
sector and accounted for nearly half of the GDP, generating over 75% of the foreign 
exchange and supporting 90% of the population; it received on average 13% of the 
development budget between 1977 and 1980. On the other hand, industry received 18.5% 




agricultural outputs stagnated while industrial outputs experienced continuous negative 
growth. The extremely high oil prices1, the low agricultural production, the declining 
terms of trade and the consistent investment in the industrial sector meant that Tanzania 
had an economy that was dependant of foreign exchange (that it didn't have the means to 
earn) to purchase fuel and spare parts. This resulted in a deterioration of large factories, 
water pumping systems, and equipment that the country lacked the money to operate and 
maintain. 
During the period from 1973 to 1980 Tanzania struggled significantly to 
overcome its economic challenges. The shocks to the economy were severe. The policies 
that Tanzania brought in were again similar to those that the Asian countries were using, 
that is focusing on developing local industry through the substitution of imports, utilizing 
local raw materials in manufacturing and limiting the power of foreign capital. Despite 
these policies, the significant external factors affecting the country without respite for 
almost a decade led to a situation where Tanzania had exhausted every means to obtain 
the required foreign exchange earnings what it required to acquire necessary inputs for 
the country as a whole. Thus, by the early 1980s Tanzania had to enter discussions with 
the IFIs for assistance. 




The liberalization of the Market: Economic Recovery? 
Throughout the 1970s as Tanzania was experiencing consecutive shocks to its 
economy help was sought through limited loans from the IMF and bi-lateral donors. The 
crisis became more acute towards the end of the 1970s' and early 1980s' and was not 
unrelated to the global crises. However, despite its efforts the Tanzanian government 
eventually had to apply the neoliberal economic policies as per the requirements of the 
IFIs in order to survive. 
In the 1980s, the IMF began to impose stricter conditionality with its loan 
agreements. As Tanzania's government continued to attempt to control the environment 
under which the economy operated, contrary to neo-classical policy prescriptions 
tensions began to rise as the IMF continued to pressure changes to the government 
policies. The 1981 negotiations regarding IMF loans ended abruptly as Tanzania refused 
to devalue its currency at the steep rates required by the IMF (Addison, 1986:81). As a 
result of the economic situation described above Tanzania was now entirely dependant on 
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements and loans. However, without the IMF who had 
been a major creditor during the 1970s', Tanzania could not secure adequate funding to 
maintain its balance of payments. It is argued that international donors were not 
forthcoming with funding due to two reasons: firstly the impact of the global recession 
but more importantly, there was increasing pressure on countries of the south to 
implement neo-classical economic policies thus the donors were aligning with the IMF 




As a result of the international pressure, Tanzania implemented a National 
Economic Survival Plan (NESP) between the years of 1981 and 1985. The basic tenets of 
this plan were very similar to those required by the IMF however the schedule of 
implementation was not as severe as that recommended (Cheru, 1989:87). Tanzania 
implemented this plan to show its commitment to the neo-classical economic policies 
however, the shortage in international funding led to escalate the financial shortage. 
During this period Tanzania built up US $300 million in trade arrears, US $100 million in 
short-term credits from private banks, and US $200 million in supplier credits as well as 
US $20 million delayed debt servicing payments (Bevan etal., 1990:332). In 1985, 
disbursements to Tanzania from the African Development Bank were stopped due to 
arrears creating a situation where the capital required for implementing the NESP was 
entirely unavailable which led to the failure of Tanzania to implement the NESP. 
1983-1985: Structural Adjustment Programme 
When the first structural adjustment programme was introduced in 1983, the main 
objective was to bring the economy back to the 1978 pre-economic crisis level. 
Agriculture was one of the priority sectors in the SAP and expenditure on agriculture was 
increased drastically from 11.7% in the 1982 budget to 23% in 1983, and then 28.5 in the 
1984 budget. Similarly, producer prices were increase by 80% for food crops and 40% 
for export crops in the 1983-1984 budget, and increased again in real terms by about 5% 




promote export earnings. During this period the General Retention Scheme (1983) was 
introduced which allowed exporters to retain between 10% and 100% of the foreign 
exchange they earned to purchase required inputs for further exports. 
However, despite these and other measures under the SAP, there continued to be a 
negative growth (Ndulu, 1986). The GDP rose from zero growth in 1983, to 
approximately 3% in 1984 and then dropped to 2.3% in 1985. This was below the growth 
rates of 1978 and resulted in a negative per capita growth when population growth was 
factored in. The only sector in which the GDP grew was in the services sector but the 
SAP measures could not halt the downward trend in the agriculture and industry sectors. 
It is postulated that this was mainly because there was a low amount of foreign capital 
inflow. In this period only 35% of the predicted foreign investment actually came and 
export earnings fell short by 33%. As a result, only 64% of the required imports were 
obtainable and necessary industrial inputs were still not readily available (Ndulu, 1986). 
In 1984, the government introduced the 'own funded' scheme. This scheme did 
not question the source of foreign exchange, due to recognition that a substantial second 
economy existed, and allowed individuals to import freely into the country. This in turn 
led to the increased retention of government foreign exchange and resulted in an 
increased amount of exports (Muganda, World Bank 2004). 
The inability of the SAP to increase foreign capital flows and export earnings had 
led the government to reduce imports in an effort to grow the previously depleted 




beginning to see challenges because of the low levels of imported inputs available. The 
deteriorating physical infrastructure, shortage of transport facilities, working vehicles, 
and the availability of fuel required for distributing imports, and to bring food crops to 
urban areas and cash crops required the government to take more drastic measures in 
managing the economic crisis. 
1986-1989: Economic Recovery Programme 
The Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) was the government's recognition 
that measures taken in the SAP were not providing the gains expected and that more 
drastic measures needed to be taken. The ERP introduced incentives for the production of 
food and cash crops and making even more resources available for infrastructure while 
improving the marketing structures. There was a major effort to procure required inputs 
particularly for the industrial sectors to improve the capacity utilization of the industries 
established after independence. 
In 1986, Tanzania signed an agreement with the IMF that incorporated many of 
the previous measures in the SAP and the ERP measures. The ERP reforms applied the 
recommendations in the SAP at a more drastic speed and with a greater emphasis on 
adjustment using various policy instruments to influence economic activity. These 
included monthly adjustments of the exchange rate, partial import liberalization 
measures, measures to improve agricultural marketing structures, further relaxation of 




measures were accompanied by reforms in the fiscal, monetary and interest rate 
structures so as to control inflation and improve efficiency in the allocation of resources. 
The ERP period saw deeper and more far reaching institutional reforms, especially in 
increasing the role of the private sector in various sectors of the economy and scaling 
down of the quantity of public sector services. 
This era marked the deliberate move of the government from Import Substitution 
Industrialization strategies to Export Led Industrialization strategies. Several schemes 
were introduced to encourage export. The first of these was to make the domestic market 
less attractive. This was done through the removal of effective protection mechanisms 
and the devaluation of the shilling. The devaluation of the shilling reduced the earnings 
potential on the domestic market and enticed manufacturers to export their products. In 
1986, the GRS was replaced by the Seed Capital Revolving Scheme where exporters of 
non-traditional products were provided with foreign exchange as Seed Capital when 
starting the business and then were allowed a 50% retention rate of foreign exchange 
earnings. Between 1985 and 1989 the number of exporters benefiting from this scheme 
rose to 51 (Ndulu and Semboja, 1996). There also existed various Commodity Exchange 
Programmes (CEPs) which allowed exporters to exchange goods for required inputs and 
spare parts abroad. Finally, the government implemented an import duties compensation 
scheme, the Duty Drawback Scheme (DDS), for duties that are levied when inputs for 




the DDS did not have a reciprocal mechanism requiring net earnings for the government, 
therefore it is difficult to assess if this scheme benefited the economy or not. 
Direct incentives to promote export were provided through the Open General 
License (OGL) established in 1988. The only requirements for access to foreign 
exchange for imports were that a the business have a legal premises, achieves the 
minimum limit for foreign exchange provision with a 100% upfront cash cover in local 
currency, and not import items not permitted by the government. Despite the various 
initiatives, the own funds import scheme remained the most widely used foreign 
exchange window. 
During this time, Tanzania's socialist policies were systematically removed from 
the government policies. The industry promotion strategy of directing investment and the 
protection of the local market and of infant industries was also dismantled. Many of the 
structures put in place survived this period. Therefore the NDC, TIRDO, TISCO, and 
TEMDO still exist in some modified form. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the challenges that Tanzania faced in attempting to 
industrialize during the period from independence to the official abandonment of the 
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) strategy the early 1980s. The initial 10 years 
after independence saw economic growth and industrial developments. This period also 




strategies, Tanzania saw an increase in exports, diversification of the domestic industry 
and the creation of decent employment. Tanzania's experience shows that a country can 
develop industry using this model given a stable global economy. 
During this period Tanzania had used many of the interventionist policies utilized 
by the Asian countries to promote exports for foreign exchange earnings, and the 
diversification of local manufactures. Tanzania had utilized reciprocal reward 
mechanisms that ensured that the benefits to foreign investors did not surpass the benefits 
to the state. It also required that local raw materials should be utilized where available 
and duty drawbacks were only granted when local raw materials were not available. Thus 
even during the 1970s, the Tanzanian government was aware that foreign investment 
needed to be directed and managed, and that linkages would not happen unless specific 
requirements to establish them were put into place, and that the state had a crucial role to 
play in nurturing and developing infant industries. 
As with the experience of most developing countries at the time, the global oil 
crises and the subsequent increases in the cost of borrowing, posed great burdens on the 
young economies. The majority of the challenges resulted from the increasing deficit in 
the balance of payments as the terms of trade declined. Thus despite having technology 
development centres and one-stop centres to assist investors (both local and foreign) there 
was little progress in the industrialization within the country during the period between 
1973 and 1980. Tanzania's challenges were further exasperated by the collapse of the 




between. Thus, it was not the interventionist policies or the ISI model that caused the 
economic collapse but rather the externalities faced by the economy. 
The liberalization period which began in the early 1980s was heavily led by the 
International Finance Institutions (IFIs). Tanzania's dire need for financing to survive 
implied that the government had little negotiating power. The government therefore 
implemented systematically the neo-liberal economic policies without reserve in 
exchange for financing. When these neoliberal policies came into place there was no 
positive growth during the 1980s but the IFIs attributed this to the long history of 'market 
distortions' that had resulted from the previous period. It was also explained at the time 
that these were merely 'short term pains for long term gains' and that growth and 
prosperity would come once the market distortions were corrected sufficiently. 
Subsequently, Tanzania has continued to implement the neoliberal policies with little to 
show for its commitment to them. The growth achieved in the 10 years from 1961 to 
1972 period has been greater, in relative terms, than the growth seen in the 30 years from 
1980 to 2010. 
All in all, Tanzania attempted from independence to 1980 to increase exports, 
diversify the domestic industry base, and to create decent employment through its 
industrialization strategies. There was some progress show in the early independence 
period but the young economy was unable to stand up to the global economic crises and 
other shocks to the economy. Hence, when the option of implementing an accelerated 




base and create decent employment, Tanzania took the opportunity decided to incorporate 





ECONOMIC GROWTH: Export Led Industrialisation 
This chapter shows how the Tanzanian policies pertaining to EPZs and SEZs will 
fail to increase exports, diversify the domestic industry base, and increase decent 
employment in the long term. The policies of Tanzania are based on neoliberal approach 
and depend heavily on attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). These policies do not 
take into consideration the learning from global experiences on the role of the state in 
developing and nurturing infant industries, mitigating the negative outcomes of EPZs or 
fostering positive outcomes. This chapter presents an overview of the development of the 
EPZ strategy in Tanzania illustrating how the process has resulted in EPZ/SEZ 
programme that is not dissimilar to other EPZ programmes around the world, and where 
incentives within the EPZs that are not significantly different from investment incentives 
outside the zones bringing into question the attraction of the zones. The chapter then 
addresses each of the objectives of the EPZs increasing exports, diversifying the domestic 
industry base, and increase decent employment individually. For each objective the 
policies will be analysed to understand the treatment of the objective, and then empirical 
evidence available on the performance of the objective is presented. However, due to the 





The Evolution of the EPZ Framework 
Tanzania has struggled at the policy level for almost a decade to develop the 
policy framework for its EPZ and SEZ programmes. In 2002, Tanzania first enacted the 
Export Processing Zones Act in 2002. This was followed by the National Trade Policy of 
2003 which laid out how EPZs would enhance industrialization. In 2004, the government 
launched the Tanzania Mini Tiger Plan which provided the framework for the 
establishment of Special Economic Zones. It was heavily based on the experiences of the 
Asian countries. In 2006, the Special Economic Zones Act was passed in Parliament 
establishing a Special Economic Zones Authority (SEZA) to over see the implementation 
of the Act. At the same time, the EPZ Act was modified to be streamlined to the SEZ Act 
and establishing an Export Processing Zones Authority to over see the implementation of 
the EPZ Act. In 2009, the EPZ Authority Strategic Plan was launched. Finally, in 2011 
both the EPZ and the SEZ laws were amended to minimize the duplication between them. 
There have been two parallel processes ongoing covering the span of over a 
decade within the government under two separate ministries and the President's Planning 
Commission to develop these zones. The first policy process was through the Presidents 
Planning Commission which first mentioned the term 'export processing zones' in the 
National Investment Promotion Policy of 1996. The President's Planning Commission 
then incorporated the idea of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) as a mechanism to achieve 
Vision 2025 launched in 1999. Furthermore, the Planning Commission developed and 




The second process was through the Ministry of Industry and Trade, where 
through various conferences and national level consultative discussions in the late 1990s 
the EPZ concept was discussed. The EPZ Act was enacted in 2002. The Act was 
followed a conference where several policy papers on trade were presented out of which 
the National Trade Policy of 2003 was produced. The National Trade Policy outlined 
how the EPZ Act would be utilized to develop industry in the country. 
The separate processes show that there was a lack of collaboration between 
leadership at the top levels of government. In the Parliamentary system to Tanzania, for 
bills to become acts, they must be introduced and discussed in Parliament. There may be 
several rounds of reading in Parliament following which the bill would be discussed at 
the cabinet level after which it would get Presidential approval. One of the objectives of 
this process is to ensure duplication and contradictions can be identified and addressed 
before the bill is enacted. However, despite this process both the EPZ Act and the SEZ 
Act were passed although, the EPZ Act was amended concurrently when the SEZ Act 
was passed. 
As many of the stakeholders for both these processes were the same, including 
national academics, and labour representatives and the processes were on going over the 
same time period, the two models that evolved were very similar. This was a duplication 
of efforts and potential source of confusion for investors and policy implementers as they 




Despite the various processes, the policy documents need to be reviewed to 
understand how the EPZs and SEZs are to be used to achieve the overall goals of 
increasing exports to increase foreign exchange earnings, to diversify the domestic 
industry base and to increase decent employment opportunities. While there are many 
policies that pertain to these issues, only the National Trade Policy (2003) which 
describes the utility of EPZs and the Tanzania Mini Tiger Plan which describes the SEZ 
will be presented below to understand the overall policy context. 
National Trade Policy (2003) 
In 2003, the ministry of Industry and Trade launched the National Trade Policy 
aimed at establishing a competitive economy and export-led growth. This is the only 
document that outlines the implementation of the EPZs in a policy document aside from 
the EPZ Act. In line with neoliberal ideology, the policy document identifies EPZs as an 
interim mechanism to counter distortions existing in the market while the government 
continues to establish a liberalised economy, with the regulatory framework and 
incentives to be provided being guided by the EPZ Act. The policy states that the 
government will specifically promote forward and backward linkages, and facilitate 
export. However, a major opportunity was missed as this policy document did now 





The policy recognized a wide range of challenges existing in the Tanzanian 
context from weak implementation of policies to low human skills capacity, low 
institutional capacity, poor infrastructure, and a small domestic market. The policy went 
on to explain how these challenges would be overcome through strengthening good-
governance, skills development, and infrastructure development. The policy document 
then provided definitions and justifications from a neoliberal perspective the incentives 
outlined in the EPZ Act. The document had a strong neoliberal bias and the pervious ISI 
strategy is criticized heavily as being state-centred and as causing inefficiencies in the 
market. 
Finally, the National Trade Policy outlined the various roles for the different 
actors in the economy presenting, for the first time in an official policy document, the 
government as the facilitator of trade through the formulation of a sound macro-economic 
environment where business activity can thrive again in line with neoliberal economics 
promoting the EPZ model. This marks a considerable shift from previous state control 
era. The private sector is also presented as the implementer of the policy and was 
recognized as a key actor in the economic growth process as per the neoliberal 
prescriptions. 
The Tanzania Mini Tiser Plan (2004) 
The Tanzania Mini Tiger Plan was launched in 2004 and aimed at industrializing 




tracking' industrialization with private sector participation through the establishment of 
Special Economic Zones. The plan was launched prior to the SEZ Act that outlined the 
establishment of such Zones. It was envisioned to be an instrument to "get the country 
out of the poverty trap" through the adoption of the Asian Development Model (Mini 
Tiger Plan, 2004:87). The model focuses on employment creation by attracting foreign 
direct investment and promoting exports through the development of Special Economic 
Zones. Unlike previous government thinking, this plan is based on a 'if you build it, they 
will come' philosophy reflecting a shift towards neoliberal economics. The plan has a 
three phased approach: 1) Build SEZs and aggressively promoting most promising 
industries such as primary and light industry and tourism; 2) improve the balance of 
payments by increasing exports from US$1.0 billion to US$2-3 billion in 3-4 years and 
then expand infrastructure through long-term borrowing from multilateral and bilateral 
donors; 3) solving as many bottlenecks by additional borrowing and foreign currency 
earning plus FDI, expand investment activities further more into high value added sectors 
and moving into larger investment projects. The plan specifically aims to develop: 
(1) 4 light industry SEZ programs by 2006 and 25-30 by 2020; 
(2) East Africa Machinery Bazaar; 
(3) out-board ship engine project in fishing fleets; 
(4) one ICT Data/Call Centre Project by 2006 and 5 by 2020; 
(5) 3 cash crop based SEZs by 2006 and 50 by 2020; 
(6) one tourism based SEZ by 2006 and 5 by 2020; 
(7) one jewellery cutting and polishing centre by 2006; 
(8) a national biomass energy program by 2006; 
(9) a ship breaking project by 2008; 
(10) a road-side Station and Corridor Development Project by 2008 and 4 by 
2020; 




(12) nation-wide program such as 'One Village One Product(OVOP)' program, 
a scholarship village tree planting program, self-help infrastructure 
development projects and mini SEZs for small and medium enterprise 
development. 
Expected results and targets of the plan by 2020 are as follows: 
• GDP to be growing at an average of 8-10 per cent and reach $40 billion 
• Exports expanded from $1.1 billion to $20 billion 
• Per capita income to be increased from $280 to at least $1,000 
• Creating 2-3 million new jobs 
• Develop at least 25-30 SEZs in the country and attracting FDI aggressively. 
In total the plan aimed at developing 14 SEZs within 2 years of its launch and 
several others in the following 2 years, with a target of almost 100 zones by 2020 (Map 
1). There was little experience within the country of what an SEZ was and what was 
required to establish such an SEZ program. The plan did not contain a work plan nor did 
it propose a governance structure for implementation. 
The Mini Tiger Plan also lacked any mention on how industrialization would be 
financed other than through US$21 million in the 2005/6 national budget (which was not 
allocated). The plan aimed at doubling FDI within two years of its launch but did not 
elaborate a strategy for this attraction other than marketing tours outside of Tanzania. 
The plan refers to incentives provided by the Tanzania Investment Act for 
promoting investment but does not state whether this is the policy framework that will be 
applied. As described above the SEZ Act did later outline a different incentive strategy 





Unlike the Asian countries strategy, the plan did not identify which sectors would 
be priority within the initial implementation but rather as per the list presented above, the 
plan envisioned working in multiple sectors and developing multiple industries 
simultaneously - many of which were foreign to Tanzania. 
Similarly, the plan discussed the industrial development potential of every region 
in Tanzania and stated that SEZs would be created in every region simultaneously, rather 
than using a phased approach focusing on the geographic areas with a comparative 
advantage. The Asian countries, had strategically introduced EPZs/SEZs in locations that 
had key success factors. The Asian countries also used a phased approach and had 
introduced one or two zones during the initial years of the EPZ/SEZ programmes and 
then scaled up the number of sites as the management know-how was developed. 
Over all, the Tanzania Mini-Tiger Plan was not adequately thought out in terms of 
its implementation plan and lacked any sort of piloting period to enable learning for the 
country in implementing this new strategy. Although the plan was launched in December 
of 2004, with several 2 year targets, the SEZ Act was only passed in 2006, which implied 
that many of the targets established by the Mini-Tiger Plan were not met during the 
prescribed time period and indeed many of which still have not been met over five years 
after the passing of the SEZ Act. 
Despite this Plan having been named after the Asian Tigers and including 
multiple references to replicating the success of the Asian countries, this plan mentions 




discuss other export promotion strategies used by the Asian countries. Thus the plan was 
a statement of a vision of what could be, with little guidance on concrete steps on how 
this will be achieved, with little analysis of how this was achieved in other places. 
EPZ Strategic Plan (2009) 
The World Bank funded the development of a Strategic Plan for Tanzania EPZ 
Programme in 2009. The main objective of this plan was to streamline the two 
approaches of the EPZs and the SEZs into one. This plan attempted to address some of 
the issues outlined in the SEZ act (discussed above). Along with the two approaches that 
had been utilized to that point in the EPZ programme: Zone development and stand-alone 
factories, the plan introduced a third type: the township model which will create towns 
equipped with a dedicated airport, seaport and housing, and will include a range of 
activities including SEZ areas, EPZ areas and even free trade zones (which have not yet 
been defined in the policy context). 
The plan attempts to prioritize interventions in a phased and systematic approach 
to developing zones reducing the chances of failure. It is the first time the government of 
Tanzania has an industrialization plan that has a work plan with specific operationalized 
tasks with responsibilities assigned to officers responsible for delivering within set time 
periods. Four geographic locations are identified for fast track rollout and a further four 
are identified for medium term development. The remaining regions that were proposed 




but not priority for the current EPZ implementation. One of the key initial interventions 
proposed in the plan was the amendment of the EPZ and SEZ Acts so that both 
programmes are implemented under one authority (later the EPZ Authority). 
Although the plan is not costed, the clear work plan with timelines makes it easier 
for the Export Processing Zones Authority to implement. The robust monitoring and 
evaluation framework provided is an additional tool that the government could utilize to 
measure its success and to strengthen the implementation of the EPZ programme. 
Being funded by the World Bank the plan presented little interms of how local 
investors and industries would be brought into the export promotion strategies. Instead 
the plan focused on how different EPZ/SEZ sites would be developed, and how the 
programme would be streamlined. 
EPZ Act Amendments (2011) 
To overcome the confusions that have been created with the creation of evolving 
programmes over the years and the simultaneous implementation of the EPZ and SEZ 
programmes, the government of Tanzania decided to amend the EPZ and SEZ Acts to 
streamline the two and to give the EPZA the jurisdiction over both programmes by 
removing the SEZA. It has also increases autonomy of the EPZA allowing it to approve 
its own operational policies and set the remuneration levels for its staff. 
There is also a major change proposed in the structure of the EPZA Council 
which is to be renamed to be a Board. The board is to be revised to be constituted of the 
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following members: the Minister of Industries; the Attorney General; the Permanent 
Secretaries of the ministries of finance, water, minerals, local government authorities; the 
Executive Secretary of the Presidents Planning Commission; the Commissioner General 
of the Tanzania Revenue Authority; the Commissions for Lands; the Chair of the 
Tanzania Private Sector Foundation and the President of the Tanzania Chamber of 
Commerce, Industry and Agriculture. 
Despite these changes to bring both programmes under one authority, the 
discrepancies in the incentive packages remain and are discussed in the next section. 
These discrepancies are key points of confusion and in some cases also weaken the 
potentials of the EPZ/SEZ programmes to achieve their goals. 
The Current EPZ Framework 
The current EPZ framework for investment and incentives is governed by the EPZ 
and SEZ Acts as amended in 2006, as the EPZ Act amendment of 2009 did not make 
changes to incentives. Aside from these EPZ and SEZ Acts which provide the framework 
for investment incentives within demarcated zones, the Tanzania Investment Act (1997) 
provides with overall framework for all investments in Tanzania outside of the EPZs. An 
issue that emerges here is that there is a high level of similarity between the TIA and the 
EPZ and SEZ Acts further causing confusions. Figure 3 below shows the similarities 
between the TIA of 1997, both the EPZ Act of 2002 and the amendments to the EPZ Act 




SEZ Act outlined three categories of investors in the zones. Category A investors were 
those who would develop the zones; Category B were investors producing for sale into 
the customs territory; and Category C were those exporting a minimum of 80% of the 
goods produced. For the purposes of this study only Category C investors will be 
considered as these are the investors who are producing for export. As seen in Figure 3, 
the major differences between the TIA and the EPZ/SEZ Acts was that the TIA did not 
have a minimum export requirement, that only 50% of foreign exchange earnings from 
local investors would be allowed to be used freely by the investor (EPZ/SEZ have no 
restriction even if investor is local), corporate tax and withholding exemptions of only the 
initial 5 years (EPZ/SEZ is 10 years), and the minimum investment requirements for local 
investors under the TIA is only US$100,000 while it is unmentioned in the EPZ Act and 
set at US$1,000,000 in the SEZ Act. Similarly, the minimum requirement for foreign 
investors in the TIA is US$300,000 while it is unmentioned in the EPZ Act and is set at 
US$5,000,000 in the SEZ Act. Perhaps the major difference could be that firms governed 
by the TIA are not exempted from import and export duties, but as there is no export 
requirement, the firm may produce for the local market hence making the tax issue moot. 
Thus, an investor can get almost the same incentives albeit for a shorter period of time 
through the TIA as from the EPZ or SEZ Acts, without being required to invest as much 
or to export. In addition, there is no difference between an EPZ investor and an SEZ 
Category C investor except that the SEZ legislation states a required minimum value for 




Tanzania Investment Act 
(1997) 
EPZ Act (2002) EPZ Act Amendment 
(2006) 
SEZ Act (2006) 













For local enterprise: 50% 
control of net foreign 
exchange earnings 
allowed for foreign 
unrestricted transactions. 
For foreign enterprise: 
unrestricted 
Unrestricted Unrestricted Unrestricted 
Corporate tax 
xemption 
Initial 5 years and 
thereafter as per the 
Income Tax Act of 2004 
(30%). 
Initial 10 years and 
thereafter a maximum 
of 25% per year. 
Initial 10 years and 
thereafter as per the 
Income Tax Act of 
2004 (30%). 
Initial 10 years and 
thereafter as per the 




5 years then: 
5% for local 
10% for foreign 
10 years 10 years 10 years 
Remission of 
customs duty, 
value added and 
any other tax 
charged on raw 
materials and 
goods of capital 
nature related to 
production 
Capital goods exempted 
indefinitely. 
Remitted 100% 
indefinitely with the 
exception of motor 




for importation of one 
administrative vehicle, 
ambulances, fire 
fighting equipment and 
vehicles and up to two 
buses for employees' 
transportation to and 
from the Export 
Processing Zones. 
Remitted 100% 
indefinitely including for 
importation of one 
administrative vehicle, 
ambulances, fire fighting 
equipment and vehicles 
and up to two buses for 
employees' transportation 






Not mentioned Yes Yes Yes 
Access to high 
quality 
infrastructure 
Not mentioned Yes Yes Yes 
Onsite customs 
nspection 




Automatically granted 5 
permits and others 
approved through 
ustification 
Not mentioned Automatically granted 
5 permits and others 
approved through 
justification 
Automatically granted 5 







Not mentioned Not mentioned Minimum local 





Eligibility New investment or 
expansions of existing 
investments. 
Existing investments 
converted to EPZ by 
stand alone approach 
Only new investments 
eligible. 





After over a decade of discussions and deliberations, the incentives and their 
requirements were decided as follows: EPZ and SEZ investments have to be larger in 
initial investment value than TIA investments, and export at least 80% of their products. 
This makes large investors eligible for the same incentives as those of a lower value and 
producing for the local market except that these incentives would be applicable for ten 
years instead of five and would include a waiver on import and export duties. As it is 
easier for industries to produce for a local market than to produce goods that are 
internationally competitive there is little incentive for investors to invest in EPZs or 
SEZs. 
The net effect of these policies is that large investors are given longer and more 
exemptions to taxes, while smaller investors are given shorter and less incentives. On the 
other hand, domestic investors have to invest less to be eligible for the same incentives as 
foreign investors. However, the policies do not protect the local market from large 
foreign investors as there is no maximum investment level in the TIA. This implies that if 
a foreign investor wanted to establish a US$5,000,000 industry for the local market there 
would be no restriction against him. Thus if there were domestic industries in the same 
sector these would be threatened. Previously, in the Tanzania Investment Promotion and 
Protection Act (IPPA) of 1990, certain sectors were protected from foreign investment, 





To add to the confusions in the policy environment, despite the first enactment of 
the EPZ Act in 2002, even as early as 1990 the Minister of Economic Policy and 
Planning was allowed to designate any area of Tanzania as a Special Growth Area in 
which enterprises may be provided with special incentives as the Minister may prescribe 
(IPPA, 1990). Furthermore, Tanzania had first established a special economic zone 
through the Dodoma Special Investment Area (DSIA) Act as early as 1989. Tanzania had 
decided to move its political capital to Dodoma, which is geographically in the centre of 
the country, for political security reasons soon after independence. However, due to the 
underdevelopment of Dodoma, the government was unable to implement this decision. 
The DSIA Act was intended to encourage investment in the area to enable the 
government to move the political capital. The incentives provided through this Act were 
very similar to those that would be provided within an SEZ. The DSIA Act included a 
sunset clause of 20 years ending in 2009. It allowed investors in the area total remission 
of any import duties for goods required in the area, exemptions from income tax and sales 
tax, 50% reduction on electricity and water costs, and access to credit on charges lower 
than market value. The Act was aimed at a wide range of business activities within the 
designated area which included industrial production of mineral processing, glass 
products, hardware products and electrical products. The area was declared a customs 
bounded area and any good being sold to entities outside of the area were subject to all 




The similarities would be a source of confusion within authorities such as the 
Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) regarding which companies were eligible for which 
exemptions based on their status. In some cases, these similarities have actually led to 
some companies renouncing their EPZ status and returning to being an investment under 
the TIA, as the requirement to export is dropped but many of the other incentives remain 
the same (Dominican, 2010). 
Tanzania therefore has several challenges facing the implementation of the 
EPZ/SEZ programme. The similarities between the investment incentives within the 
EPZ/SEZ areas and outside the EPZ areas through the TIA and the DSIA provide little 
motivation to both local and foreign investors to invest within the EPZ/SEZ Areas unless 
they are purely producing for export. This therefore means that the Zones that have been 
developed are primarily attractive for the FDI-type investors. These investors would have 
extensive tax exemptions, few linkages with the local economy and may provide jobs 
although the quality of these jobs is unknown. Thus the investors would be attracted 
through the EPZ/SEZ incentive packages are those through whom few of the envisioned 
benefits will materialize. 
The management and implementation of both the EPZ and the SEZ Acts has been 
put under and independent one stop EPZ Authority. Similar to the Asian industrialization 
strategies, the Tanzania EPZ Authority is autonomous allowing the authority to approve 
its own operational policies and set remuneration of its staff. The Authority is overseen 




Attorney General; the Permanent Secretaries of the ministries of finance, water, minerals, 
local government authorities; the Executive Secretary of the Presidents Planning 
Commission; the Commissioner General of the Tanzania Revenue Authority; the 
Commissions for Lands; the Chair of the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation and the 
President of the Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture. In the Asian 
countries model, the board overseeing the export promotion strategies was made of high 
level policy makers who could monitor the development of local industries and address 
the bottlenecks to export. The Board in Tanzania was initially established of Ministers of 
the respective ministries listed above but in the amendment of 2011, the responsibility of 
collaboration and oversight was placed at the Permanent Secretaries level as it was 
understood that this is the level where implementation decisions are made. However, 
unlike in Korea and other Asian countries, the high level board in Tanzania had been 
unable to provide adequate oversight on the EPZ/SEZ programme. The lack of 
coordination evident throughout the parallel processes during the first decade of 
development has been an illustration of the gap in adequate leadership and coordination. 
As discussed in chapter 1, one of the key interventions by the Asian governments in 
ensuring the success of the EPZ programme was the close oversight and follow up from 
high levels of government. In Tanzania it is now assumed that the policies and incentive 
packages have been determined and the only level of oversight support required now is at 




the incentive packages making the policies overlapping and confusion. Thus, remains a 
need to clarify these confusions. 
Although, foreign investors are actively being sought for the EPZ and SEZ 
programmes the provision for a lower minimum value for local investors to be eligible 
for the SEZ incentives implies that the government does want to promote the local 
industrial sector into export. This is not being done with the same level of "push" as was 
done in the Asian countries and the major focus remains on attracting foreign investors to 
the programme. It remains to be seen if the Board of the EPZA is able to encourage and 
reward local investors' attempts to export as was done in the Asian countries. 
This section has illustrated that the EPZ and SEZ regimes in Tanzania fall far 
short of the industrialization regimes utilized in Asian countries with respect to increasing 
exports for foreign exchange. The strong focus on FDI and the extremely lenient 
exemption measures means that the country will have significantly reduced foreign 
exchange earnings. The similarities to the incentives provided outside the zones, and the 
weak coordination and leadership at the national level means that investors will not be 
attracted to investing within the zones to the extent that they could be. Finally, the 
inability to protect the local market from foreign investors that may invest under the TIA 
means that it would be unlikely for local industry in Tanzania to be to competitive with 
international firms that may produce for the local market. It seems in this regard the EPZ 





Since independence, Tanzania has recognized the need to earn foreign exchange 
through exports. Even during Tanzania's Import Substitution Industrialization period the 
emphasis on exports and particularly value added exports had remained. As discussed in 
chapter two during the period from independence to the economic recovery period, 
significant investment was made in the manufacturing sectors as Tanzania strove to 
develop its comparative advantage in selected industries within the East African Union. 
Both the EPZ Act and the SEZ Act state the increase of exports as one of their 
major objectives. The EPZ Act goes further to state that the creation and expansion of 
foreign exchange earnings would be the second benefit. Both the Tanzania Mini Tiger 
Plan and the National Trade Policy state clearly that one of the key objectives of 
increasing exports is to increase foreign exchange earnings and the balance of trade. 
There is also a closely connected discussion in both documents on the importance of 
exporting value added products. 
Tanzania has historically encouraged the use of local technology in the 
development of the industry base through organizations such as TBRJDO and TEMDO 
(discussed in chapter 2). These organizations have continued to exist but have focused 
their attention on smaller scale mechanised products such as the production of cooking 
oil at village level. 
Both the EPZ and the SEZ Act are heavily focused on foreign companies being 




investors are encouraged to invest - evident through the lower threshold for eligibility of 
incentives under both the SEZ and the TIA investment schemes. It is proposed that the 
zones would provide two main sources of foreign exchange earnings: firstly, directly 
through the increase of earnings from exports from both foreign and local firms; and 
secondly, where the firm is a foreign firm, foreign exchange could be earned indirectly 
through the conversion of earnings into local currency to buy local goods (for 
consumption), for paying taxes and salaries. 
Tanzania however, provides a 10 year exemption to all investors on all taxes, on 
imports and exports. This implies that for the initial 10 year period all tax earnings would 
be zero. In the case of local firms, foreign exchange earnings would therefore be the 
profits earned through exports that remain within the country. This would not be the case 
with foreign firms as the SEZ and EPZ Acts allow foreign companies the right to 
repatriate 100% of the profits made back to the 'home' country and therefore these would 
not remain within Tanzania. Thus the policy framework for Tanzania allows the country 
to earn foreign exchange from foreign firms only through what they convert to pay local 
staff salaries, and for consumption. Meanwhile the country's earnings from local firms is 
from the export earnings. As EPZ/SEZ firms are to export a minimum of 80% of their 
products, it can be assumed that the largest part of the foreign exchange earning would be 
from the export earnings. As export earnings of foreign firms (minimum investment 
US$5,000,000) that are usually larger than local firms (minimum investment 




significant earnings from the exports. Thus, in order for Tanzania to achieve it objective 
of increasing exports to increase foreign exchange earnings, it is more logical for 
Tanzania to encourage local investors in EPZ/SEZ investment as the policy framework 
implies that the foreign exchange earnings from the exports will remain within the 
country. 
Export Performance 
Exports in Tanzania have increased over the years and this is particularly true for 
the period starting from 2007. Beginning from the early 2000's imports began to grow 
exponentially, and the deficit in the trade balance was getting larger. The trend line in 
Figure 4 illustrates the ratio between exports and imports. For the balance of trade to be 
even the value of this ratio must be below 1 or below. In Tanzania, the trade balance has 
not been even since the early 1970s. Tanzania started to export gold in 1999, at which 
point the Bank of Tanzania began to disaggregate data illustrating the value of gold in net 
exports. Beginning in 2002, the difference between the value of imports and exports 
began to grow illustrated by the increase in the ratio starting in 2002 as there was an 
increase in imports. The gap between exports and imports grew wider until 2007, at 
which point there is a clear decline in the ratio. This is attributed mainly to the increase 
in gold exports as the country has recently become the third largest exporter of gold in 
Africa. Gold and other precious metal exports constituted almost 45% of the total value 
of exports in 2009. The global increase in gold prices has lead to a further valuation of 
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Tanzania's exports but this should not be mistaken with increased exports of 
manufactured goods. 
Imports have continued to rise at an exponential level. Tanzania's primary import 
commodities are fuel oil, transportation vehicles and grain. Tanzania's electricity 
consumption has grown over the last two decades and as a result Tanzania's hydropower 
dams are unable to meet the increased demand. As a result, Tanzania has to rely on 
imported diesel fuel to create electricity as well as for transport which have been 
increasing over the past decade. In 2010, oil was 25% of all imports and was the largest 
single import of the country. This results in an increasing dependency on imports to run 




The following charts are from the Bank of Tanzania's annual report for 2010 
which was released in mid 2011. Figure 5 (BOT, 2011:29) illustrates the changes in the 
trend and structure of Tanzanian exports from 2005 to 2010 showing that non-traditional 
Figure 5: Trend and Structure of Tanzania Exports (millions of US$ at 2010 constant prices) 
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exports have increased significantly during this time while traditional exports have grown 
little. 
Figure 6 (BOT, 2011:29) shows the make up of exports in the fiscal year from 
July 2009 to June 2010 which illustrates that gold made up over 44% of the total exports 
an increase from 39.9% in fiscal year 2007/8. In the fiscal year July 2007 to June 2008, 
manufacturing made up 18.1% of total exports. By fiscal year 2009/10 this had only gone 
up to 19% illustrating that the sector grew much slower than gold exports. Similarly, in 
the fiscal year 2007/08 manufacturing sector contributed 9.2% to GDP earnings, while in 
2009/10 this contribution had only increased to 9.5%. 
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Bank of Tanzania (2000 - 2011) 
The manufacturing sector has not significantly grown between 1998 and 2008 
despite the efforts to increase manufacturing in EPZs and SEZs. There has only been a 
1% change in the sectors' contribution to the GDP, rising from 8.4% to 9.4% between 
1998 and 2008 (URT, 2009). Exports are still a small share of the GDP and of these only 
40% were manufactured exports in 2008 (BoT, 2008). 
Exports from EPZs have grown in value to about 10% of total exports. Figure 7 
below illustrates the increase in EPZ exports from 2007 to 2010. However, the EPZA was 
unwilling to share detailed data and merely provided aggregated data from financial 
audits. Thus it is impossible to tell from this data if the exports were from foreign or local 
companies and as a result, it is impossible to estimate the amount of this activity is 
contributing to the country's foreign exchange earnings. However, it is possible to 
conclude that the value of exports in the EPZs has been increasing over the past 4 years. 
Tanzania's exports have been increasing over the past five years albeit because of 
the increased value of gold. Similarly, Tanzania's imports have been increasing due to 
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the increased oil-fuel consumption. However, the data also show that the value of 
Tanzania's EPZs exports has increased. Unfortunately because of the reluctance of the 
EPZA to provide disaggregate data it is impossible to estimate the amount of foreign 
exchange earnings that have remained in the country as a result of EPZ exports. 
In summary, exports since the year 2000 have increased in value however, this 
increase has mainly been due to the increase export of gold from the country. 
Manufactured goods make up under 20% of the total exports of the country. By 2010, 
EPZs contributed only about 50% of manufactured exports and therefore about 10% of 
the countries total exports. 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Both the Tanzania Mini Tiger Plan and the National Trade Policy stressed the 
importance of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) via the EPZ strategy as this 
would contribute to the development of the Tanzania's domestic industrial sector. There 




2001; and Daima Associates, 2007), as well as the extensive control and direction of FDI 
in the Asian Tiger and Tiger Cub countries as well as in some Latin American countries. 
Although there were many differences between these countries policies, they were similar 
in that they were very sceptical of foreign investors and significant measures were taken 
to control the power of FDI (discussed in chapter 1). However, in line with the neoliberal 
economic position, there has been no discussion of the control or the limits of FDI in the 
policy documents that have been reviewed. FDI has been treated as a homogenous entity 
and there has been no analysis presented of it. All that is discussed is that FDI is required 
for the development of industries and merely building EPZs and SEZs will draw the FDI 
to Tanzania. 
Figure 8: Imports. Exports. Trade Deficit and FDI 
Yur 




Despite the high dependence on FDI in Tanzania's EPZ and SEZ programmes, 
the FDI inflow in the country has not increased significantly in the last 10 years since the 
launch these programmes. As discussed above, during this period both exports and 
imports have increased. Figure 9 below presents the overall FDI in Tanzania which has 
remained under US$1 billion per year. The EPZA was unwilling to provide disaggregate 
data on the level of foreign direct investment within the EPZs. However there has been 
little change at the national level in FDI flows into the country (UNCTAD, 2011). 
Tanzania's EPZ programme has from its onset seen foreign direct investment as 
the key driver for development within these zones. In 2006, the EPZ Act amendment 
allowed the EZPA to enter into joint ventures to develop new zones. This shift has further 
deepened the reliance on foreign investment in the EPZ programme as even the 














development of the zones is now dependant on investors with tax exemptions. 
As of May 2011, there are 25 Gazetted zones in Tanzania; 6 of these are industrial 
parks while 19 are standalone factories. In total, there are 44 companies licensed with the 
EPZ or SEZ status. However, many of the licensed companies are not yet operational. 
The table below is a presentation of some of the companies registered. Forty one percent 
of these are purely foreign investment and 44% are local investment. The 15% presented 
as joint ventures are EPZA partnerships with private sector companies to develop new or 
existing zones. Agro-processing and engineering are the major sectors of investment 
(36% each) with the textile sector having 18% of the investment and mineral processing 
standing at 10% of total investments. 
Although FDI has not increased in Tanzania over the past 10 years, exports have 
increased. This implies that despite the heavy focus on FDI in the EPZ strategy, Tanzania 
has not been able to attract significant FDI. One explanation could be that as many of the 
other countries in the region are also implementing EPZ strategies and are attracting FDI, 
Tanzania is unable to attract FDI because of its insufficiently developed policy 
environment with the EPZs. However, the unintended benefit of this is that domestic 
capital is benefiting from the EPZ strategy and local know-how is being built in the 
absence of foreign investors. 
Diversification of Domestic Industry Base 
Both the EPZ and the SEZ Acts refer to the development of local industry through 




Policy and the Tanzania Mini Tiger Plan specifically mention linkages as being an 
important component of diversification of the industry base. From a policy perspective, 
countries have commonly utilized a quota system, requiring investors to source a 
minimum level of inputs from the local market. The Tanzanian EPZ/SEZ laws and 
policies, contain no such requirement. Following the principles of the neoliberal 
economics, companies may source their raw materials for anywhere in the world. When 
goods enter into the country bound for EPZs or SEZs, these goods are given transit status 
and are not charged any type of duty for being imported into the territory. On the 
contrary, goods that are bought locally for use as inputs into EPZ or SEZ would incur an 
export duty that would be charged to the local company selling to the EPZ/SEZ company 
which in effect discourages local firms to sell to EPZ/SEZ firms. As discussed in Chapter 
2, the Government of Tanzania was utilizing schemes that required manufacturers of 
export goods to utilize a minimum amount of local products in production in the 1970s. 
However, these measures were removed during the Economic Recovery Period and the 
Structural Adjustment Programmes and have not been able to be introduced again. 
With respect to technology transfer, with the lack of linkages being forced there is 
little incentive for advanced manufacturers to develop the skill and technology base in the 
local market. There has not been a framework to establish any strategic partnerships 
between research organizations (both universities and technical organizations) and 
manufacturers in the EPZs or SEZs. In the Asian countries these partnerships were 




country in a particular industry. This skill base can then be developed to innovate and 
create new methods of production. 
Unfortunately, at present due to the infancy of the EPZ and SEZ programmes in 
Tanzania, there is little data available about the level of local materials being utilized in 
goods produced for export. In the 2011 annual report to the Treasury Department, the 
EPZA reported that 85% of investors utilize some local material in their production for 
export. However, the value of this material was not presented (EPZA, 2011). 
This section illustrates that there has been little done from the policy side to 
ensure that linkages happen. The global experiences have demonstrated that linkages, 
technology transfer and industrial know-how do not happen by default as prescribed by 
the neoliberal economists. Instead, most countries have had to establish direct quota or 
other mechanisms in the policy framework to ensure these benefits of EPZs and SEZs 
materialize, however, none of these are present in the Tanzanian policy framework. 
Decent Employment 
The policies clearly state employment creation as a key objective of pursuing the 
EPZ and SEZ strategies. Although there has been a high level of neoliberal influence in 
Tanzania's EPZ/SEZ programme, and the increased focus on FDI has required the 
government to provide many investment incentives, the current EPZ regulations do not 
provide EPZ workplaces exemptions from the country's labour laws. The EPZA Board is 




possible that exemptions could be made, however, to date, no such exemption has been 
reported. In addition to this, Tanzania has very progressive labour laws which are applied 
uniformly inside and outside the EPZs, requiring employers to grant paid maternity leave, 
annual leave, and compassionate leave. In addition, the law stipulates maximum working 
hours for various sectors, as well requires all employers with 5 or more employees to 
contribute to the National Social Security Fund at 10% of the salary of the employee (in 
addition to the salary paid to the employee). The Labour Act however does not require 
employers to provide mechanisms for upgrading of skills neither outside nor inside the 
EPZs. 
Tanzania's population is approximately 45 million and grows by about 1 million 
people each year. The latest unemployment rate available was for 2006 which pegged 
unemployment at almost 12% with 630,000 new candidates entering the labour market 
each year (NBS, 2006). The national unemployment rate for men is 10.7% and the ILO 
estimates that 90% of jobs are in the informal or agricultural sector. For women the 
unemployment rate is 12.6% with over 96% of jobs being in the informal or agricultural 
sector (ILO, 2010). Thus over 90% of employment in Tanzania is in the informal or 
agricultural sectors where incomes are unreliable and vulnerable. Women and those 
living in urban areas are disproportionately unemployed with unemployment figures 
being 12.6% for women and 22.6% for urban populations (NBS, 2006). 
Over all the employment of the manufacturing sector was reported as 1.4% of 




is estimated that by the end of 2008, employment in zones was only 2.5% of total 
industrial employment in Tanzania (Farole, 2011) thus being 2.5% of 1.4%. However, 
according to the audit reports of the EPZA the employment figures in EPZs have 
consistent increased of the past several years. For the year from July 2010 to June 2011, it 
is estimated that EPZs provided direct employment to 13,500 individuals and indirect 
employment to 60,000. 






30-Jun-ll 13500 60000 
30-Jun-10 10000 32300 
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Controller and Auditor General Audit Report (2007, 2008, 2009,2010, 2011) 
Almost 8,000 of these jobs are in A to Z Textiles, a locally owned textile and 
mosquito net manufacturing EPZA factory. This one factory located in Arusha employs 
more than 50% of EPZ workers in Tanzania. While this company is locally owned, 
several of the senior management staff are expatriate textile management professions. A 
recent study conducted by the University of London, School of Oriental and African 
Studies, found that the employment conditions within this factory allowed employees to 
develop skills and have sustainable livelihoods, respected the rights of workers, provided 
safe places to work, giving employees sufficient time away from work and enabling 




Minimum wages in Tanzania vary across the different employment sectors. They 
range from 65,000/- (Tanzanian shillings) in the hotel, tourism and domestic service 
sector to 350,000/- in the mining and aviation sectors. The minimum wage in the 
manufacturing sector is 80,000/- per month (ATE, 2010). The average salary of 
employees in A to Z Textiles is 140,000/- which is 50% more per month than the national 
minimum wage. There are opportunities for employees to make an additional 40,000/-
per month in overtime. Employees of A to Z Textiles claim to be able to support not just 
their immediate families but also relatives with school fees and access to health services. 
It is estimated that through these jobs about 25,000 dependents are supported (Jennings, 
2011). 
According to Jennings (2011), A to Z Textiles pays better than other 
manufacturing jobs in the geographic area thus resulting in the company being perceived 
as a good employer and as contributing to the local economy through the provision of 
local income streams. The company gives employees 28 days of paid leave per year, 4 
days of emergency leave, 3 months maternity leave and the ability to negotiate longer 
unpaid leave if required. The company also provides consistent training and upgrades 
skills of workers and on the job training upon initial recruitment. Trade Unions are free to 
organize in the factory and the Tanzania Union of Industrial and Commercial Workers 
(TUICO) provides several trainings on workers rights and entitlements several times a 
month, in addition, the management and workers have a weekly meeting. Workers in this 




health centre and a hospital at the factory site. Workers are also provided with voluntary 
individual and family housing with electricity and water on the site of the factories 
(Jennings, 2011). 
Although, A to Z textiles is only one EPZ site, it represents more than 50% of the 
jobs available in EPZs in Tanzania. The evidence shows that these jobs are not only 
better than other jobs available in the area; they are also generally meet the ILO criteria 
for decent work. It is possible that this employer will establish a precedent and a 
minimum standard to the jobs available in Tanzania EPZs. It must be noted that this is 
local investor and most of the employment standards violations occur when foreign 
investors are involved and when the 'race to the bottom' gets more intense. In addition, it 
should not be assumed that the conditions in one firm would be the same in other firms 
even if this firm represents the majority of jobs. 
The data shows that the majority of jobs in the Tanzanian EPZs do meet many of 
the criteria of the ILO Decent Work agenda despite these jobs being in EPZs. The major 
employer in the EPZs is a domestic investor who provides health benefits, housing, paid 
leave, the right to unionize, on the job training, decent working hours, 50% higher wages 
than the national minimum wage for these positions, social security and the free 





This chapter has presented the policy environment of the EPZ and SEZ 
programmes in Tanzania. The lack of focus and coordination in developing the 
programmes resulted in two parallel and almost identical programmes being developed in 
the country in a process that long and protracted. Despite this, the policy regime that 
evolved was similar to what already existing in the Tanzania Investment Act of 1997. 
While the initial impetus had been to replicate the successes of the Asian Tiger 
countries through the development of the Tanzania Mini Tiger Plan, there seems to have 
been little analysis or inclusion of the actual policy approaches utilized by the Asian 
countries to develop local industries. Unlike the Asian model where the state played a 
strong role in coordinating and managing the foreign direct investment as well as in 
developing and nurturing the infant industries, the Tanzanian model has emerged as the 
standard neo-liberal model implementing the neoliberal policies. 
In all three aspects analysed, the increase of exports, the diversification of the 
domestic industry base, and the creation of decent employment opportunities, the 
Tanzanian policies have declared aspirations towards achieving ambitious targets. 
Despite global experience where these targets have not been met unless the foreign 
investors are required to contribute to them through policies, the Tanzanian policies do 
not in any way require the investors to meet these targets. 
Although the discussions about EPZs began as early as 1996, and the EPZ Act 




amendment in 2006, thus the EPZs have only been operational for 5 years after the 
establishment of the Export Processing Zones Authority (EPZA). Perhaps because of the 
infancy of the EPZ and SEZ programmes in Tanzania, little empirical data is available on 
any of the major indicators being aspired towards in the programme. 
Empirical data on exports generally shows that EPZ investors are exporting more 
products. In 2010, EPZ exports currently only make up approximately 8% of total exports 
of Tanzania. On the other hand, national data shows that FDI flows into the country have 
remained unchanged in the past 10 years implying that even if the EPZs are attracting 
foreign investors, they are not making a difference in the national FDI stock. The EPZ 
authority reports that approximately 40% of the companies operating in EPZs are foreign 
implying that 60% of the investors are domestic or are in joint-ventures. This then 
implies that the the EPZ strategy to attract and depend on FDI is failing, and that the 
government of Tanzania should be looking more at incentivizing investment for domestic 
capital. 
Fortunately, empirical data was available for employment in EPZs. Putting 
together data from the CAG reports as well from academic publications, it can be 
concluded that although EPZ jobs are small in number in the country, they are currently 
good jobs that adhere to the principles of decent work. The incentives being provided to 





Over all this chapter has illustrated that although the initial formalization and 
implementation of the EPZ and SEZ programmes was extremely slow, over the past few 
years there has been some progress in the zones but in terms of exports as well as in 
terms of employment creation. The policy framework for incentives has been heavily 






The purpose of the thesis was to determine if Tanzania's Export Processing Zone 
(EPZ) Programme will contribute to development. Given that Tanzania is a latecomer in 
the implementation of EPZs, it was a great opportunity for Tanzania to develop an EPZ 
model that would take into consideration lessons learned from other country's 
experiences in order to ensure success. 
Based on a review of the EPZ and industrialization literature, the thesis statement 
argued that Tanzanian EPZ programme will not achieve the objectives of increasing 
exports, diversification of Tanzanian domestic industry, and increase decent employment 
opportunities because it was based on a neoliberal approach. 
The literature review demonstrated that EPZ programmes failed to achieve the 
desired outcomes because they were implemented using a neoliberal approach thus 
assuming that industrial policy should be the same for any country. However, in countries 
where EPZs have lead to development outcomes, the state has had to play a very active 
role in tweaking and customizing the EPZ programme to protect and nurture infant 
domestic industries and to ensure that the benefits of having foreign direct investment 
(FDI) manifest. 
The discussion in the literature review illustrated that the neoliberal approach 
prescribed that the benefits of EPZ would manifest through the 'magic of the market'. 
However, it also showed that in countries that utilized a purely neoliberal approach, these 




approach and adopted interventionist practices that allowed them to adapt the EPZ model 
that benefits manifest. 
The discussion of Tanzania's industrial policy showed that Tanzania had great 
success during its implementation of the ISI strategies. However, the external shocks 
occurred in the 1970s sent the country spiralling into debt which eventually led to an 
economic crash. Thus Tanzania was forced to abandon many of its ISI strategies and 
adopt ELI approaches to industrialization. In an effort to recover from the economic crash 
of the early 1980s, Tanzania has liberalized its economy and deregulated its markets are a 
rapid pace. However, the industrial sector has failed to grow despite implementing all the 
neo-liberal prescriptions. Exports have remained low and undiversified and the problem 
of balance remains as it did during the ISI period. 
The EPZ case study showed that Tanzania continues to follow neoliberal policy 
prescriptions despite the experiences of countries around the world. The standard model 
of EPZs has failed to increase exports, diversify the domestic industry base, and increase 
decent employment opportunities. Despite this, Tanzania has embarked upon a path that 
is no different. Thus the EPZs in Tanzania will not achieve their development goals 
because the policies that have been put into place do not allow the state an active role in 
controlling and guiding the investments nor developing the domestic industrial sector. 
The data from the policy analysis shows that Tanzania has not introduced any of 




Latim American countries, even though the vision that led to the introduction of the 
EPZ/SEZ strategy was to replicate the successes of the Asian countries. 
The heavy dependence on FDI in Tanzania to finance industrialization means that 
local industries are not nurtured or protected while the foreign firms get indirect subsidies 
through attractive incentive packages. This is happening despite there being a higher 
number of domestic investors in the EPZs. The increasingly attractive incentive packages 
developed in a neoliberal context continues to imply revenues of host countries, like 
Tanzania, are lost while profits of foreign firms are repatriated away. 
Tanzania, like many other developing countries is under immense pressure to 
liberalize economies and markets, and the costs of failing to adhere to these requirements 
are grave. Policy makers must reconsider the impacts of implementing policies that have 
proven to be unsuccessful in almost every other country as in the case of EPZs but also in 
the case of the country itself. Countries like Tanzania have been implementing market-
led strategies for almost 3 decades without having much in terms of economic or 
industrial development to show for it, while when state-led strategies where being 
implemented there were significant results to show within a period of 10 years. Countries 
must consider their development strategy with their outcomes in mind, and then develop 
policies that will bring about the desired outcomes, especially when viable examples of 
innovative approaches are available. Instead, countries are forced to work within a small 
range of policy options that primarily give the state very limited power to influence 




With the implementation of Tanzania's EPZ/SEZ programme within the 
neoliberal orientation, another opportunity to develop the industrial sector has been lost. 
The overall beneficiaries of this programme will not be the host countries of the EPZs, 
but rather the share holders of foreign companies. Meanwhile the cost of providing the 
subsidy will be borne by the Tanzanian state and the infant industries with Tanzania, as 
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